

Contemporary Psychology

A JOURNAL OF REVIEWS

June 1959

VOLUME IV • NUMBER 6

- | | |
|----------|---|
| Page 161 | Human Potentialities , by Gardner Murphy
<i>Reviewed by M. B. SMITH</i> |
| 164 | Dreams and the Uses of Regression , by B. D. Lewin
<i>Reviewed by C. S. HALL</i> |
| 165 | Facts and Theories of Psychoanalysis , by Ives Hendrick
<i>Reviewed by L. D. ERON</i> |
| 167 | The Quest for Identity , by Allen Wheelis
<i>Reviewed by R. W. WHITE</i> |
| 168 | No and Yes: On the Genesis of Human Communication , by R. A. Spitz
<i>Reviewed by R. C. MISCH</i> |
| 170 | L'examen clinique en psychologie , by André Rey
<i>Reviewed by R. H. SHEVENELL</i> |
| 171 | CP SPEAKS
By the EDITOR |
| 172 | Lolita , by Vladimir Nabokov
<i>Reviewed by ROGER BROWN</i> |
| 174 | Psychotropic Drugs , by S. Garattini and V. Ghetti (Eds.)
<i>Reviewed by V. R. CARLSON</i> |

(Continued on inside cover)

Published by THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

Edwin G. Boring, Editor
Harvard University

EDITH L. ANNIN, Assistant to the Editor

ADOLPH MANOIL, Film Editor
Park College

Editorial Consultants

FRANK A. BEACH, *University of California*

PETER A. BERTOCCHI, *Boston University*

JUDSON S. BROWN, *State University of Iowa*

ROGER W. BROWN, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

CLAUDE E. BUXTON, *Yale University*

JACK W. DUNLAP, *Stamford, Conn.*

RICHARD M. ELLIOTT, *University of Minnesota*

ANN M. GARNER, *Lincoln, Neb.*

FRANK A. GELDARD, *University of Virginia*

DANIEL KATZ, *University of Michigan*

DONALD W. MACKINNON, *University of California*

MELVIN H. MARX, *University of Missouri*

DOUGLAS MCGREGOR, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

QUINN MCNEMAR, *Stanford University*

CLIFFORD T. MORGAN, *The Johns Hopkins University*

NORMAN L. MUNN, *Bowdoin College*

CHARLES E. OSGOOD, *University of Illinois*

VICTOR RAIMY, *University of Colorado*

FILLMORE H. SANFORD, *University of Texas*

NEVITT SANFORD, *University of California*

ROBERT R. SEARS, *Stanford University*

HAROLD SEASHORE, *New York, N. Y.*

S. SMITH STEVENS, *Harvard University*

DONALD E. SUPER, *Teachers College, Columbia University*

GEORGE G. THOMPSON, *Syracuse University*

BENTON J. UNDERWOOD, *Northwestern University*

S. RAINS WALLACE, JR., *Hartford, Conn.*

ROBERT I. WATSON, *Northwestern University*

ROBERT W. WHITE, *Harvard University*

ROBERT B. ZAJONC, *University of Michigan*

CONTENTS—continued

- 175 **The Man in Management: A Manual for Managers**, by L. C. Steckle
Reviewed by R. B. FINKLE
- 176 **Psychotherapy by Reciprocal Inhibition**, by Joseph Wolpe
Reviewed by J. B. ROTTER
- 180 **Personality and Organization: The Conflict between System and the Individual**, by Chris Argyris
Reviewed by MASON HAIRE
- 182 **Drug Addiction: Physiological, Psychological, and Sociological Aspects**, by D. P. Ausubel
Reviewed by VIN ROSENTHAL
- 183 **Function Fluctuation**, by C. C. Anderson
Reviewed by G. A. FERGUSON
- 184 **Counseling and Learning through Small-Group Discussion**, by Helen I. Driver
Reviewed by MILTON SCHWEBEL
- 185 **Professional Ethics and Civic Morals**, by Emile Durkheim
Reviewed by B. J. BIDDLE
- 186 **Racial and Cultural Minorities: An Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimination**, by G. E. Simpson and J. M. Yinger
Reviewed by SEYMOUR FESHBACH
- 187 **The Appraisal Interview: Objectives, Methods and Skills**, by N. R. F. Maier
Reviewed by W. J. E. CRISSY
- 188 **The Twice Born**, by G. M. Carstairs
Reviewed by S. L. SHARMA
- 190 **FILMS**
By ADOLPH MANOIL, Film Editor
Living in a Reversed World, reviewed by J. F. CORSO
Film
- 191 **ON THE OTHER HAND**
- 192 **List of Books Received**

Books for review, review manuscripts, letters for publication, and correspondence concerning editorial matters should be sent to the Editor, Edwin G. Boring, Memorial Hall, Harvard University, Cambridge 38, Mass.

Films for review and correspondence concerning films should be sent to the Film Editor, Adolph Manoil, Park College, Parkville, Mo.

ARTHUR C. HOFFMAN, Managing Editor; HELEN ORR, Promotion Manager

Communications concerning subscriptions, change of address, claims for the nonreceipt of a number, advertising, and other business matters should be sent to the American Psychological Association, Inc., 1333 Sixteenth Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Address changes must reach the Subscription Office by the 10th of the month to take effect the following month.

Contemporary Psychology: A Journal of Reviews is published monthly. The yearly volume comprises approximately 384 pages. The subscription per year is \$8.00, foreign \$8.50, single number \$1.00.

Published by the American Psychological Association at Prince and Lemon Sts., Lancaster, Pa. and 1333 Sixteenth St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

Second-class postage paid at Lancaster, Pa., and at additional mailing offices.

© 1959 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

Contemporary Psychology

A JOURNAL OF REVIEWS

VOLUME IV

June 1959

NUMBER 6

Murphy's Novum Organum

Gardner Murphy

Human Potentialities. New York: Basic Books, 1958. Pp. x + 340. \$6.00.

Reviewed by M. BREWSTER SMITH

Dr. Brewster Smith is still just barely Professor of Psychology and Director of Graduate Training in Psychology at New York University because in 1959-60 he will be Professor of Psychology at the University of California at Berkeley. He is editor of the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, currently President of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, and late—as recently as 1956—of the staff of the Social Science Research Council. He is a social psychologist with relatively tenderminded interests (he says) but with a relatively tougher scientific conscience (he hopes).

"The world of our present consciousness," said James, "is only one out of many worlds of consciousness that exist." Other new worlds—physical and social—keep coming into existence, ready to act upon man. We are beginning to recognize a few; the more important thing is to recognize the infinity of the quest.—Gardner Murphy (p. 154).

IT SEEMS just right that Gardner Murphy should call on William James as witness for what he says is the central theme of this serious but popular book, "a plea for the adding of dimensions as rapidly as areas of experience appear which cannot, however forcibly, be squeezed into the dimen-

sions that we know." In contemporary psychology, Murphy's figure at the height of an important career presents a strikingly good fit to the long shadow of James. There is the sympathetic resonance to the clinical attitude on the part of a theoretically bent academic who is in no sense a clinician. There is the open empiricism, sensitive to the unbounded richness of the world of experience and restive against the limits imposed by any attempt to encompass aspects of the presently known in tight and exclusive systems. Widely respected but not quite 'respectable,' Murphy, like James, has stood apart from the central conforming trends of psychology, and like him has been drawn to borderlands of psychical research in a spirit of undogmatic openness that both would distinguish from gullibility. Both are tenderminded scholars whose ambivalent investment in the discipline of fact has generated tensions that underlie their creativity.

The correspondence extends to the persistent temperamental bias that they manifestly share toward a sunny view of the human condition. Their optimism is fused with a voluntarism and activism that sees the good life as within the practical reach of human thought and effort; a perspective, once regarded as peculiarly American, that can seem



GARDNER MURPHY

bland or shallow to those whose opposite temperamental biases, perhaps abetted by psychoanalysis or theology, lead them to give more emphasis to the dark, the passionate, and the unreconcilable in human experience. And both are generalists who write uncommonly well.

All of these traits contribute a decidedly Jamesian cast to Murphy's lay sermon on human nature and human potentiality, in the setting of today's awesome problems and dangers and of tomorrow's uncertainties. Essentially an integral work, the book incorporates several of Murphy's previously published addresses and occasional papers, including his 1953 Kurt Lewin Memorial Award Address of the same title. Readers acquainted with his previous writings will find its psychological perspective familiar; what is novel lies rather in his speculative extrapolation

to weigh the alternatives that he sees humanity facing. It is clearly intended as a mind-opening book, not a finished work presented for criticism or agreement.

Technical criticism would indeed be difficult, for Murphy's range of acquaintance is broad, and ideas from contemporary physics and physiology jostle with historical and humanistic references without much benefit of scholarly apparatus; Lewin rubs shoulders with Schroedinger, Toynbee, Kallman, Riesman—and Kahlil Gibran. While it is pleasant to think that not *all* of these excursions and allusions would appear accurate or apt to the appropriate expert—a legion of experts would be required to make the test—I shall limit my attention here to the broader structure of Murphy's approach and to a few of the issues that it raises.

WHAT is man? Murphy organizes his answer to this ageless question on a scaffolding of "three human natures," which together define man's limitations and his potentialities.

First, *man as animal*. Here clues are sought about man's precultural humanness from a look at his simian collaterals, and from inferences as to what must be the intrinsic needs and capacities of the culture-bearer that we know. Murphy's view, as developed in previous more technical works, envisages an emerging multitude of essentially biological human motives, in contradistinction both to the common list of 'primary' tissue needs and to doctrines such as Gordon Allport's functional autonomy that see adult motivation as detached in principle from its ontogenetic roots. Besides the familiar survival drives, differentiated sensory capacities entail intrinsic esthetic motives and satisfactions; elaborated motor capabilities bring with them the motivation to put them to use. And, as Murphy italicizes, "the very processes of learning and thinking may in themselves become satisfying."

Murphy's long-term favorite among conceptualizations of the learning process is of course "canalization," the progressive strengthening of a preference for one among several ways of satisfy-

ing a drive. That it has won little general acceptance despite his persistent advocacy can perhaps be traced in part to its close linkage to his pluralistic and emergent conception of original motivation: if you are to get human complexity as well as diversity from canalization, you have to be willing to postulate no little motivational complexity to start with.

Canalization provides the link between biological man and the "second human nature," that of *man-in-culture*. There are overtones of the Rousseau tradition in Murphy's account of culture, which comes off rather badly at his hands. Intrinsicly tending toward standardization and rigidity, culture threatens in a machine age to blight the fulfillment of human potentiality, if people manage to survive their cultural dilemmas now posed in atomic terms.

We have seen [writes Murphy in a passage worth quoting] that the rigidities, the intellectual shackles come with life itself: the opaqueness, the obtuseness, the crassness of organic stuff; the difficulty of learning anything; the preference for blood rather than brains and for lazy rather than effective solutions; the proneness to lapse back into the earlier methods of mammalian adjustment; the jerry-built, yet rigid, structure of all human cultures which have shaken down to some sort of working order by incorporating many of the monstrosities and brutalities into the scheme so as somehow to prevent its developing that subtlety, richness, and imagination which sensitive individual thinkers and artists could provide; the inveterate, case-hardened, arrogant assurance of each culture-bound group that it has found the solutions; and the tendency to treat as "enemies of the people" those who see things in another way. . . . How, then, with all this massive system of fetters and manacles which man has forged for himself, can there be self-discovery, self-emancipation from the blind and obdurate system of self-obstruction, the cultural chrysalis within which man has so snugly rolled himself? (p. 109).

What may emerge from self-discovery and self-emancipation Murphy labels the "third human nature," in which the "creative thrust of understanding" brings to light ever novel and unexpected potentialities of man and his environment. Murphy is very serious about the im-

portance of fostering creativity, and about the vistas that open, once limiting preconceptions are set aside. But I doubt whether he has much investment in the formulation that allocates creativity to a "third human nature." This I take rather as a way of speaking adopted for semi-popular presentation.

ACTUALLY, Murphy bases his hopes that man can break through the cultural mold squarely on features both of human biology and of culture as he conceives of them. "Heaven lies about us in our infancy," as he might have quoted Wordsworth; before unfortunate acculturation has done its damage, the young human animal responds with delight to environmental challenge as he explores the worlds opened by his sensitivities and developing powers. Creative potential is thus part of the "first human nature." As for the "second human nature," a culture that includes science is not all rigidities. With science, man invented invention and systematic discovery. For the first time in his geologically brief existence, he has thus created the possibility of transcending himself at an ever-accelerating tempo through planning based on understanding, in which his original curiosities are sharpened and channelled by the instruments and strategies of science. Murphy writes as a latter-day prophet of the scientific attitude, particularly as applied to man and society. To prophesy in this vein, whether in the mode of essay or of science fiction, can be trite and sterile; for the most part, this book is not.

Potentiality and *emergence*, key terms in the expanding vistas that Murphy unfolds for us, are dangerous words, and scrutiny of how Murphy employs them is in order. Writing from the broad view of field theory, he scrupulously avoids the pitfall of entelechy, of assuming predetermined ends that, being somehow immanent in the actual, thus comprise the potential. Just as actual human nature is a temporally integrated resultant of genetics and environment, so one can usefully speak of human potentialities only in relation to projected environments in which they may be evoked as new resultants. It is in this

"We do not live," said Groddeck; "we are lived." But we can learn to live, to study the latent potentialities of mankind, discover which ones are feasible and satisfying, and utilize science, education and government to achieve them.

—GARDNER MURPHY

context that Murphy speculatively envisions alternative directions that society may take. Human nature for Murphy potentially embraces far more variety than it is possible for us to imagine, rooted as we must be in our own historically dated perspectives and assumptions. But it is not infinitely malleable. Limitations both in the genetic pool (including bounds in its rate of change even under eugenic planning of a sort not presently feasible) and in the number of possible and viable social environments place restrictions on the varieties of human nature that may result from their interaction.

Loosely speaking, these resultants are emergents, something new under the sun. Murphy seeks to use this appealing term more narrowly when he writes:

Emergence defines the process by which co-working factors result in a *new form of organization*. It is the appearance of a new total arising from a series of interdependent changes, *no one of which has any specific predictive power for a new system of functions* (p. 238).

Elsewhere he phrases human progress (I use the word advisedly, though it is not Murphy's) in terms of the metaphor of new *dimensions* that emerge orthogonally to what has existed or been experienced before and can thus not be formulated within the prior framework. It would seem as though he were fully committed to a doctrine of emergence in the strict sense linked to qualitatively distinct levels of integration.

Yet in the last analysis Murphy shows misgivings about this view.

The reason why the mystery of predicting an emergence ordinarily remains is that we do not know enough about the underlying structure of events. From this it would follow only that the emergence is baffling,

not that it is inaccessible to scientific prediction. It is baffling just because the specific subject matters have not been mastered. It is not an instance of a truly unknowable, a true shift to another plane about which no conclusions can be made at an earlier stage or a lower level (p. 260).

One may ask, how can one learn about this "underlying structure of events" without studying them in interactive relationships that give the novel properties a chance to emerge? Granted that a metaphysics of science, one that posits broad realms of knowability, offers more support to research morale than one that places narrower bounds on the knowable, this apparent inconsistency in Murphy's thinking stands out against his general sure-footedness.

THE ever-accelerating emergence of new human potentials evoked in shifting man-made environments presents a giddy vista, but Murphy finds it good. Perhaps, one might object, such a Faustian perspective is itself culture-bound; perhaps it is a view that has particular appeal to Western—or American?—man with his persistent idea of progress. I think Murphy might make rejoinder that through the vigorous and corrosive spread of science and technology, Western urban-industrial culture in its crucial aspects is speedily becoming the culture of mankind. The rest of the world may well be committed to this dizzy chase whether it likes it or not.

But within this vista of kaleidoscopic change, people constantly face choices, which they may now be able to confront more knowingly than before. How have we the right to choose for unborn generations? And by what criteria? In a sophisticated discussion of the ethics of planning that deserves serious attention, Murphy suggests that we should set goals for human nature in society that promise to bring forth "tendencies within the individual person which give intrinsic satisfaction and cause no excessive conflict, falling foul of other tendencies" (p. 275). This criterion deserves closer scrutiny than there is space to give it here. Applying it, Murphy arrives at the tentative view

that the good society is one that evokes and strengthens love and *curiosity* or *interest* (both esthetic and cognitive) in its members.

If goods like these are part of human potentiality, so is a frightening array of evils, to which Murphy pays notice in comment on current crises but rather quickly passes over to dwell on what can become the legitimate aspirations of mankind. Salvation is a bootstraps operation, and realistic optimism in Murphy's vein requires a practical program for getting started on the upward path. Unfairly we look to Murphy for new suggestions, for social psychological catalysts that can somehow transmute vicious cycles into benign ones. Of course there are no panaceas at hand. Murphy has in passing a good many wise things to say about the merits of progressive education (significantly he avoids the term) as it has been conceived by its wiser proponents from Dewey on, and about a variety of social issues in the short and the long run. Those who are led to expect more by the press notices or by their private hopes and anxieties will be disappointed.

Although *Human Potentialities* is written nontechnically, I think its primary audience, apart from psychologists and students of psychology, will not extend beyond those laymen who already have a fairly well-developed and informed psychological interest. Demands on others may be too great for their attention to be sustained. Indeed, a certain repetitiveness, together with idiosyncracies of latent structure in Murphy's always lucid style, pose occasional problems of attention even for a well-motivated psychologist.

What psychologists think of this book will depend less on their appraisal of Murphy's specific assumptions and ex-

The great problem is always the discovery of new dimensions, and the most universal of keys yet discovered for the unlocking of these mysteries is the study of the blind assumptions which make their existence remain unguessed.

—GARDNER MURPHY

trapolations than on how they resonate to the Murphy world view. From this standpoint, the book is not a bad diagnostic instrument for discriminating the tough and the tenderminded. Many will reject it as a tissue of words that has little to do with scientific psychology. Others will find it hopeful and exciting, good propaganda for the kind of psychology they should like to see prevail.

My own protocol on this test, if I must expose it, would reveal strong ambivalence. I find the prospects that Murphy opens exciting, in some ways appalling, and certainly well worth thinking about. I wish there were better evidence for some of the things Murphy thinks we know. Where I think knowledge is lacking, I wish that some of the

fundamental uncertainties had received more emphasis as such. And at the end of the book, I was disappointed that the high expectations its intent aroused at the outset were not entirely fulfilled. All the same, I recommend the book as one that deserves to be widely read.

There is no longer any place for the "nothing but" kind of explanation of man. In no branch of science has the "nothing but" method proved successful in recent decades; it is a poor method in the biological sciences and poorest of all, indeed, in the case of man.

—GARDNER MURPHY

Somnio Ergo Sum

Bertram D. Lewin

Dreams and the Uses of Regression. (Freud Anniversary Lecture Series.)

New York: International Universities Press, 1958. Pp. 64. \$2.00.

Reviewed by CALVIN S. HALL

Dr. Hall, long at Western Reserve University, is now Professor of Psychology at Syracuse University, Executive Officer of its Department of Psychology, Director of its Training Program in Clinical Psychology. In the larval stage he was a Guthrie-genic behaviorist. As a pupa he was a Tolmaniacal purposivist not unaffected by Lewin. Now, as a matured long-lived butterfly, he is a staunch disciple of Freud. His interests in man, Freud, and dreams are all parts of the same thing. For more about Hall, see the review of his and Lindsey's *Theories of Personality* (Wiley, 1957; CP, Aug. 1957, 2, 201f.), his review of Roback's *Present-Day Psychology* (*Philos. Lib.*, 1955; CP, Aug. 1956, 1, 237), and his articles on paperbounds in psychology (CP, Oct. 1956, 1, 291-294; Nov. 1957, 2, 275-278; May 1958, 3, 119f.).

"THIS theory [of dreams] occupies a peculiar position in the history of psycho-analysis; it marks a

turning point. With the theory of dreams, analysis passed from being a psycho-therapeutic method to being a psychology of the depths of human nature. Ever since then the theory of dreams has remained the most characteristic and the most peculiar feature of the young science, something which has no parallel in the rest of scientific knowledge, a new found land, which has been reclaimed from the regions of Folklore and Mysticism." (S. Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, 1933.)

Further on in this lecture, Freud lamented that his colleagues "behave as though they had nothing more to say about the dream, as though the whole subject of dream-theory were finished and done with." An exception to Freud's wholesale indictment of psychoanalysts for their failure to develop and elaborate his favorite brain-child is provided by Bertram D. Lewin, former president of the New York Psychoanalytic Society and the American Psychoanalytic

Association and an organizer of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute. The small volume which is the subject of this review, *Dreams and the Uses of Regression*, is the ninth publication on dreams by Lewin during the past ten years. It was delivered at the seventh Freud Anniversary Lecture established by the New York Psychoanalytic Institute in 1951 to honor the birthday of Sigmund Freud on 6 May.

It may sound like carping to begin a review by complaining about the title of a book but I am an advocate of informative labeling. A more informative title would be *The Influence of Descartes' Dreams on His Dualism*—for that is what Lewin's address is primarily about. Every graduate student who has read Boring's *History of Experimental Psychology* knows that Descartes had three dreams on a single night which changed his role from that of a Parisian playboy to that of a profound thinker. Lewin now tells us that these dreams of Descartes were responsible for the kind of philosophical system he devised.

"In short, I should like to hazard a hypothesis: when Descartes came to formulate his scientific picture of the world, he made it conform with the state of affairs in an ordinary successful dream. The picture of the dream world that succeeds best in preserving sleep came to be the picture of the waking world that succeeded best in explaining it scientifically. The relation of the observer to the observed in a dream was set up as the metaphysically proper relation of the scientific observer to the scientifically observed and observable in waking life. Mental ego-feeling in the dream became Cartesian mind, *res cogitans*; the dream picture became Cartesian matter, *res extensa*. It is desirable in a dream to separate mind and matter; this helps preserve sleep. It was desirable for Descartes also in his philosophy to separate mind and matter, as a preliminary assumption for the understanding of the real world" (pp. 50-51).

How Lewin buttresses this hypothesis by evidence mined from the most famous triad of dreams in modern history is an absorbing intellectual adventure. Not only does he illuminate the origin

of Descartes' famous or infamous dualism, but he also demonstrates the various strategies of interpretation that may be brought to bear upon dreams. There is far too little of this broad-gauge type of analysis in the literature on dreams. Much of it is a tiresome repetition of psychosexual interpretation. The dream deserves better treatment than it has received since Freud made the study of dreams scientifically respectable. Lewin is to be commended for presenting such a penetrating study of a dream series.

I am surprised that Lewin did not discuss the parallel between the primary and secondary processes of Freud and *res cogitans* and *res extensa* of Descartes. It will be recalled that the first stage of mental development, according to Freud, is completely subjective. The baby is a miniature monist *cum* Berkeley until he finds that subjective idealism affords little protection against the slings and arrows of a cold, cruel world.

Then he matriculates in a Cartesian school of metaphysics where the distinction between the subjective and objective (secondary process) is made plain. Thenceforth, except for minor aberrations such as dreams, visions, and hallucinations, or for the major aberrations of the organic and functional psychoses, he lives in a world where the contour between mind and matter is defined, if not sharply, at least pragmatically. We are all Cartesians in our daily lives whatever we may think we are when we cast our vote for a particular metaphysical system.

This reviewer endorses Lewin's statement: "One would like to know what Einstein dreamed, or Leibnitz, or Lao-Tse." For I believe that the dream is the *via regia* to *res cogitans*. Philosophers and scientists should pave the royal way by following the example set by Descartes. *Somnio ergo sum!*

broader, more scientifically dispassionate presentation than is furnished in his book.

The first edition, published in 1934, states that its purpose is to render "an epitome of psychoanalysis, a survey of the whole science." Although the book distills the writings of Freud admirably well, it falls short of its objective. *Facts and Theories of Psychoanalysis* was almost out of date when the first edition was published 23 years ago, and this third edition does not do justice to the advances in psychoanalytic theory which have been made in the intervening years, including the contributions of those who have remained within the mainstream of Freudian psychology as well as the so-called 'deviationists' (he who questions libido theory). For example, there is little reference here to either the autonomous functions of the ego or any of the non-instinctual determinants of personality. Dr. Hendrick gives grudging recognition to some of the recent work in ego psychology, but the efforts of Hartmann, Lowenstein, Kris and Rapaport toward clarifying the secondary process are wholly neglected. As for those who have left the fold—or have been expelled by Dr. Hendrick—there are few kind words. Adler's theoretical formulations are called "absurd," Ferenczi's objections to Freudian concepts are "neurotic complaints," and Horney's criticism, "diatribes" and "unscientific." Rank's hypothesis of the birth trauma is described as an "ill-founded idea," and the best that can be said for Sullivan is that "if he did not have a unique need to formulate his own postulates in his own language" he might have agreed more with Freud. One of the few modifications of Freud's original ideas that the author recognizes as perhaps legitimate, is Helene Deutsch's exception (1925) to Freud's account of the development of the sexual instincts in little girls. In general, Dr. Hendrick dismisses the effect of the more recent controversies within psychoanalysis as "quite transitory," and he leaves no doubt that for him all the truths were revealed by 1940.

Why then has he felt a revision of his book necessary if neither the 'facts' nor the 'theories,' as he sees them, have changed? For one thing, he brings the

But Which is Fact and Which Theory?

Ives Hendrick

Facts and Theories of Psychoanalysis. (3rd ed.) New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958. Pp. xxi + 385 + xvii. \$6.00.

Reviewed by LEONARD D. ERON

Dr. Eron, who is Director of Research in the Rip Van Winkle Foundation at Hudson, New York, is a clinical psychologist and a child psychologist with a PhD from Wisconsin. He is also a Research Associate in Psychiatry at the Yale University School of Medicine. At Hudson he is engaged in a large-scale, long-time, psychosocial, developmental study of aggressive behavior in children. In New Haven he is working on the effects of medical education on personality, and showing, he thinks, that a medical education obtained after the first five years of life can still do something to the educatee.

IF the term *psychoanalysis* is limited to the written words of one man, albeit a giant, then this third edition of

a 'minor classic,' written by an orthodox, Bostonian analyst, is indeed a good exposition of that brilliant, but loosely articulated, series of observations, interpretations and hypotheses—some verified but many untested, if not untestable—concerning the dynamics of human behavior. Dr. Hendrick is eminently qualified for such an expository task. He studied at the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute in the twenties and since that time has been active in psychoanalysts' affairs. From 1949 to 1955 he was Director of Medical Education at the Boston Psychopathic Hospital where so many psychiatrists, social workers, and psychologists have been trained. From such a man, who has himself contributed to the enrichment of psychoanalytic theory and practice, one would expect a

section on the history of the psychoanalytic movement (as contrasted with its theoretical advances) up to date: the virtual removal of the centers of psychoanalytic activity from Europe to America, the mushrooming of the training institutes, the dominant influence of psychoanalytic thinking on all branches of psychotherapy, the applications of psychoanalysis to the arts, anthropology, religion, and the social sciences. Although this account includes a listing of the names of eminent persons who have contributed to psychoanalytic thinking or used it in their work, there are many curious omissions in addition to those noted above. For example, a psychologist reading the section on social science would look in vain for the names of Neal Miller, Hobart Mowrer, John Whiting, Ernest Hilgard, Else Frenkl-Brunswik, and Nevitt Sanford. John Dollard is mentioned briefly, but only as author of *Class and Caste in a Southern Town*. It is probably safe to say that in the social sciences, the so-called 'deviationists'—Horney, Fromm, and Sullivan—have had at least as much influence as the orthodox analysts. This fact, however, is not apparent in the book.

THE best section of the volume is that dealing with psychoanalysis as a therapeutic technique. Dr. Hendrick describes in simple terms the concepts of transference and resistance and how they can be successfully handled by an experienced therapist, offering in profusion illustrations from patients' records. Indications for psychoanalytic therapy he conveniently summarizes in a section which, along with an appended glossary of psychoanalytic terminology, should be quite handy for the beginning intake worker or clinical psychologist. On the other hand, the chapter in this section dealing with the evaluation of the results of analysis is disappointing. Dr. Hendrick is aware of the difficulties which beset researchers in psychotherapy, but he dismisses them lightly, saying it is too early in the history of psychoanalysis to expect any rigorous quantification or methodological controls. The efforts of Carl Rogers and his associates in the evaluation of non-



IVES HENDRICK

directive therapy, and of John Dollard and his students in the evaluation of psychoanalytically oriented therapy, however, deny the necessity for standards of methodology less rigorous in this area of behavioral research than in others.

Dr. Hendrick is opposed to the practice of psychotherapy by non-medically trained persons because the libido is a biological concept. If, indeed, the etiology of mental illness were largely biological, then Dr. Hendrick might be justified in his view; but nowhere in his display of "facts and theories" does he show that biological factors have anything to do with psychotherapy, analytic or otherwise. In fact he asserts the contrary. In detailing the failure of efforts to localize the unconscious physiologically, he says, "our knowledge of the more subtle and complex physiological functions in neurological pathways is wholly inadequate to describe the unconscious in a useful way by its unknown chemico-physical properties or anatomical localization. If, however, in

accordance with our observations, we formulate our inductions and generalizations in *psychological* [italics are Dr. Hendrick's] terms, we succeed in describing certain properties in general laws of the unconscious which are of substantial value." The latter statement might have been written by any behaviorist who relies on an 'empty' organism.

IN general, this volume does a creditable job of summarizing Freud's psychology at a level appropriate to the understanding of an advanced undergraduate. Nevertheless, because of the finality with which most of the statements are made, it can become quite misleading. The answers to the questions about psychoanalysis are by no means all in, and any introductory work which gives the impression that all the controversies have been settled does the beginning student a disservice. The very title of the book is misleading. The 'facts' which Dr. Hendrick lists include such things as unconscious guilt, the female Oedipus complex, the latency period, sublimation. Although the existence of those constructs may be inferred from repeated observations on many patients, it is still not justified to call them facts, for it is entirely possible for other observers, noting the same regularities in overt behavior, to infer different constructs to account for them—as they indeed have. The author lists about as many 'theories' as he does 'facts' and herein lies the fallacy of applying the term *theory* to this series of hypotheses. Optimally, one good theory should account for all the behavior under consideration, and it should not be necessary to have discrete theories to explain different sets of phenomena. Perhaps what is needed are more facts and fewer theories.



The world of books is the most remarkable creation of man. Nothing else that he builds ever lasts. Monuments fall, nations perish, civilizations grow old and die out; and, after an era of darkness, new 'races' build others. But, in the world of books are volumes that have seen this happen again and again, and yet live on, still young, still as fresh as the day they were written, still telling men's hearts of the hearts of men centuries dead.

—CLARENCE DAY

Can Psychoanalysis Provide a Sense of Identity?

Allen Wheelis

The Quest for Identity. New York: W. W. Norton, 1958. Pp. 250. \$3.95.

Reviewed by ROBERT W. WHITE

Dr. White is a Diplomate in Clinical Psychology, late Director of the Harvard Psychological Clinic, present chairman of Harvard's Department of Social Relations, author of Lives in Progress (Dryden, 1952) and The Abnormal Personality (Ronald, 2 ed., 1956; CP, Mar. 1957, 2, 61f.), and by now a familiar figure among CP's reviewers.

THIS book is unusual in form, and its evaluation offers an unusual problem. The author, a practising psychoanalyst, describes it as "an essay on man in mid-twentieth-century America," concerned "with his changing character, with the loss of his old identity, with his search for a new one," and also "with psychoanalysis to which he turns with increasing frequency in this quest." It is thus a general discussion of important social and psychological problems, but it is interrupted every so often by bits of personal narrative, sketching the author's background and giving episodes from his life between the ages of 7 and 20.

These narratives, written in the third person, take up a third of the book and give it extraordinary vividness. We are taken to the small Louisiana town from which the family sprang; we attend family prayers and spend a grim Sunday according to the usages of Southern Methodism; we become startled witnesses of a father's incredibly savage method of teaching the virtues of work; and we suffer with a young man who develops acute insomnia when he cannot bring an ambitious novel to its conclusion. That the young man had literary gifts is now attested, but this early

impasse, which he finally solved by a surprising piece of self-insight, helped turn his steps toward medicine and psychoanalysis. Thus he became embarked upon a career which led through medical training at Columbia, service as medical officer in the Navy, advanced training at the Menninger Foundation and the New York Psychoanalytic Institute, staff membership at the Austen Riggs Foundation in Stockbridge, and finally private practice in San Francisco, where he is also on the staff of the Mt. Zion Psychiatric Clinic.

What are these narratives of early life doing in a book on the changing American character? They are not intended to prove anything. They are meant to serve as illustrations of social change, and they illustrate "what we were rather than what we are, what we are moving away from rather than what we are moving toward." It seems to me that they do this very well, provided we think of them as highly individual experiences which are probably not typical of the people today who most crave a sense of identity. Certainly it should not be concluded that such problems arise only when one is cut loose from a rural and strongly religious background.

Wheelis is aware, of course, that by interweaving personal background with general ideas he is violating a tradition in scientific writing. Even Freud, implacable depth-analyst of other people's productions, had his say on society in strictly impersonal language, and he would surely not have been amused to hear (as I did recently) a speaker miscall his book "Civilization and Freud's Discontents." Wheelis's candor may

trap a few readers into taking the whole book as a personal document, but I cannot see that his thesis is injured by the revelation that finding a sense of identity has been a central problem in his own life. It is not from inexperience or indifference that we should expect wisdom to flow.

IN describing the change in American character Wheelis relies most heavily upon the work of David Riesman and C. E. Ayres, in addition to his own observations from behind the couch. To interpret what is happening he uses the concepts of psychoanalysis, especially Erik Erikson's concept of ego identity. "Identity is a coherent sense of self. It depends upon the awareness that one's endeavors and one's life make sense," also "upon stable values, and upon the conviction that one's actions and values are harmoniously related."

Today, when the values of the past are becoming foreign while those of the future cannot be anticipated, it is hard to find a solid basis for a sense of self. We try to fit ourselves only for constant change; we emphasize "flexibility, adjustment, warmth," at the expense of more remote ideals and committed goals; we try to be in harmony with the group and forget to specify what the group is doing. But this intention does not work. It creates, so Wheelis tells us, a sense of futility, of emptiness, and of longing for a real and significant sense of identity. It is this lack of a stable center that makes us so vulnerable to mass movements, and it is this lack which brings many patients to the psychoanalytic couch.

For psychoanalysis this situation creates an unexpected and serious problem. At the time of its origin, psychoanalysis dealt chiefly with symptom neuroses (hysteria and compulsion neurosis). It achieved good results by weakening the powerful superego and thus restoring to conscious control the repressed impulses which had been sustaining the illness. Today the symptom neuroses are rarely seen. Their place has been taken by 'character disorders,' over which the analyst must spend more time and be satisfied with less change. The whole problem for psychoanalysis

has altered, a very upsetting thing for a cumulative science. In the contemporary character pattern the superego is not particularly strong and the unconscious no longer has its earlier force. There is not nearly so much to uncover in the patients, and uncovering is the only operation for which psychoanalysis is suitable. Actually the patients want something that isn't there—a sense of identity, the very kind of thing which psychoanalysis cannot provide. Terminating the transference becomes increasingly difficult and, when it is accomplished, the patient, perhaps better adjusted than before, has still found no solution to his main problem.

There is surely much truth in the picture thus far sketched, but has it not been overdrawn? One thinks immediately of two kinds of people who may be fairly numerous: people who are flexible, adjusted, warm, and not at all troubled by a felt emptiness or lack of sense of identity, however deeply they may trouble a shrewd observer of mankind; and people whose weak sense of identity is a symptom which may resolve itself when neurotic inhibitions are removed. Although he writes about social history, Wheelis does not sufficiently protect himself from bias in the sample of patients seen in his own practice. There is a considerable margin of uncertainty about the generality of the problems he describes.

WHAT are the prospects of future quests for a sense of identity? The social forces which for some people have undermined this sense are moving at an accelerated pace and are not reversible. The rate of technical and cultural change is now so great that "no character that is fixed can remain adjusted." A sense of identity depends upon values, and certain superordinate values, which conferred meaning upon life and established man's place in the universe, are rapidly crumbling away. Wheelis makes a black-and-white distinction between *institutional* and *instrumental* processes. Likening them to Freud's primary and secondary processes, he sees the first as the product of desires and fears, seeking certainty through the making of myths; whereas, in contrast, instru-



ALLEN WHEELIS

mental processes are rational and realistic, seeking mastery through the making of tools. Rational values—those based upon instrumental processes—are now in rapid ascendancy, while myths and eternal verities are fading at a rate "in excess of our ability to get along comfortably without them." Nevertheless, we must do without them. We must pattern our expectations upon those of science, which is never final, always under revision, and we must be content not to find our sense of identity ready-made but to create and achieve it in the course of realistic social living.

This is brave counsel, but it is surprising to find it issuing from a psychoanalyst, especially from one who so shrewdly unveils the institutional processes that have occurred within psychoanalysis itself. Analysts have always, of course, taken sides with the soft voice of the intellect, and they have never expected it to be a ringing shout. And if Wheelis rejects psychoanalysis as a way of discovering one's sense of identity, he bids us in effect to be rational on this subject with only those resources we have always possessed. What is needed here is a much less sharp distinction between institutional and instrumental, between myth and reason, for a sense of identity; even that of an analyst, must always have some elements of myth. We need to think of better and poorer myths rather than of a world that has been sterilized of myths.

The book would have ended badly with its grim summons to rationality, and perhaps it is for this reason that Wheelis has added a final chapter on the vocational hazards of psychoanalysis. Here he describes the disillusionments likely to be felt by a young analyst who has entered with great faith in the power of insight or with hope that analytic practice would satisfy a timid need for intimacy. Here he is again at his best, observant, challenging, original, eloquent, a mind with which one likes to visit even when agreement is not complete.

Yes and No on No and Yes

René A. Spitz

No and Yes: On the Genesis of Human Communication. New York: International Universities Press, 1957. Pp. xii + 170. \$4.00.

Reviewed by ROBERT C. MISCH

who is a Staff Psychologist at the Veterans Administration Hospital in Boston. He received his doctorate in clinical psychology a few years ago in the atmosphere of developmental psychology that you find at Clark University, so no wonder he is interested in psychotherapy, psychoanalysis, children, and the development of gesture in the maturing organism. He thinks that psychology could do with a little more observation and description in these days and a little less theory—especially when theory transcends data.

"In psychoanalysis we never find a No in the unconscious," wrote Freud in 1925. If not in the unconscious, then whence does it come? From the nursery, is the dictum: the first No means *No more milk*.

René Spitz is a well-known physician and psychoanalyst who practices in the New York area and has devoted his professional life to the psychoanalytic study of early infancy. He is best

known for his description in 1945 of *hospitalism*, a syndrome of apathy and depression found in young children and infants who have been hospitalized for long periods and thus separated from their mothers' care. He holds that skin contact is essential in 'mothering,' that mechanical substitutes for the mother's touch are dangerous. He lectured at the Sorbonne in 1934, wrote *Die Entstehung der ersten Objektbeziehungen* in 1957. *No and Yes* is the sixth in his series of publications on early infantile development. In it he works out the development of the head-shaking gestures for both *No* and *Yes* and also proceeds backward to fix the motor 'prototypes' for the gestures.

To establish a connection between the early nursing situation and *No* and *Yes*, the author has ranged far from his usual preserves. He brings in material from ethology and embryology as well as from his own observations on hospitalized infants. Such broadening of the psychoanalytic horizon deserves praise, even when it fails. In particular it fails because the material from ethology and embryology remains pretty much an undigested foreign body in the *corpus* of his theory; or, to alter the metaphor, this attempt to integrate material from ethology and embryology with ego psychology involves the author in a bigger bite than he can chew.

Much of the trouble seems to stem from an old poser: the mind-body problem. Certainly there is historical precedent within psychoanalysis for confusion on this issue. Freud, forever the dualist, seemed to be trying to compromise when he defined *instinct* as "a borderland concept between the mental and the physical," and this dualism has carried over into the nomenclature of psychoanalytic theory (e.g., oral-dependent, anal-sadistic, phallic-narcissistic). Spitz, apparently in imitation of Freud, looks for a 'biological' basis for the *No* gesture as well as an ego-psychological one (identification with the gestures of prohibiting adults). Thus he arrives at the quasi-ethological concept of a preformed motor 'prototype' (he even calls it an "IRM"—an innate releasing mechanism) for the motion of the sated infant shaking the nipple from its mouth

and for the head-shaking gesture of *No*—viz., the rooting (perioral) reflex.

The whole concept of a 'prototype,' in the author's sense, is a peculiarly difficult one to manage. It is vague, and this vagueness is not clarified by referring to it as an IRM. It seems to mean only that one finds some formal similarity between an early pattern and a later one in order to refer to the early pattern as a 'prototype.' What, for example, about swimming? Swimming motions can be seen in neonates and even occur *in utero*. Is this early motor pattern thus a 'prototype' of swimming at a beach? If that were so, the neophyte swimmer could simply activate his dormant neonatal and embryonic 'swimming' and be done with the bother of lessons, with the struggles to mimic actions and to integrate them into patterns of his own use. The truth is, of course, that this early reflexive 'swimming' bears no demonstrable relationship (other than a superficial similarity of motion) to the swimming learned at a beach. One does not learn the Australian crawl by modifying 'prototypical' motions. The crawl is learned, as many a summering ten-year-old could testify, by awkward imitation and much practice. The concept of 'prototype,' as used by Spitz, skips lightly over the problems of learning; it would seem to leap from the embryo full-fledged to Johnny Weismuller, obscuring thereby any consideration of the *process* by which a motor pattern is achieved. The same argument applies to the grasp reflex as the 'prototype' of hitting a home run, or the rooting reflex as the 'prototype' of breast refusal and *No*.

(One may also mention in passing that the existence of vertical head-nodding for *No* in some cultures (e.g.,

Greece) casts further doubt on the rooting reflex as a 'prototype'.)

THIS conceptual confusion appears to be a symptom of a general problem which is becoming increasingly evident as psychoanalytic clinicians become more interested in the ego and hence in general psychology. The problem is simply that the great preponderance of psychoanalysts have little acquaintance with psychology, and their unfamiliarity with a strange field often leads them to substitute common sense for established psychological principles. This deficiency is particularly evident in formulations of thought processes according to the model of Aristotelian logic. Thus Spitz holds that negation is the first abstract concept to develop because it is *logically* propaedeutic to any judgment.

After this unconvincing beginning, the reviewer was pleasantly surprised by the long last chapter on the self. In dealing with the child as he has come to know him clinically, Spitz becomes what a good clinician can be: a suggestive source of hypotheses. Even the style of his writing changes. He ceases being turgid and becomes quite clear. He is a long way from ethological speculation when he describes the detachment of the child from his concrete imbeddedness in the immediate situation as being accelerated by prohibitions and frustrations, and when he conceptualizes this situation as leading to an identification with the prohibiting adult and hence to an early articulation of the self-image as distinct from its immediate surroundings. This last chapter is almost worth the price of the book. Had it been made the starting point of a monograph on ego development, a substantial contribution might well have resulted.



Our universities can serve the nation best not only by giving increased attention to the need for scientific knowledge but to the need for knowledge about the world itself. Education for Western civilization is not enough; beyond Europe lies the preponderance of the world's peoples. Who they are, what they believe, and what they want—rather than what the Russians alone say or want—could determine the outcome of the great debate.

—NORMAN COUSINS

Clinical Psychology in Geneva

André Rey

L'examen clinique en psychologie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958. Pp. 222. 660 fr.

Reviewed by RAYMOND H. SHEVENELL

Dr. Shevenell is Head of the School of Psychology and Education in the University of Ottawa. Once a philosopher turned psychologist, he is now experimental psychologist turned clinician. Once he tried to translate some of the American tests into French and found that metempsychosis is impossible—presumably because the tests are not culture-free.

THIS volume, *The Clinical Examination in Psychology*, the obvious English translation of this French title, is prepared by André Rey, a professor in the Institute of the Sciences of Education at the University of Geneva. Since it gives the reader a glimpse of 'experimental psychology' contributing to the medical diagnoses, and since it presents a 'clinical psychology' dutifully subservient to medicine, it could be titled, at least from Rey's point of view, *Clinical Psychology in Geneva*.

The book has two parts of about equal size. The first presents the theory, the approach, and the techniques of the author. The second describes in some detail six interesting tests.

Rey is a functionalist whose basic postulates are garnered from his theory of learning. He separates the technician with his *testologie* from the psychologist who has an idiographic approach to the individual; and then he goes on to describe his *Clinical Psychology*.

A chapter of *General Psychology* runs for fifty long pages, full of French technical vocabulary, in an attempt to present the theories of both the learning and the motivation which are at the basis of the subsequent testing. No bibliography, not even a reference, can be found in this section. Was it written for

the psychologist who can use the tests that are later described in detail? or for the cultured reader who is apt to dabble in testing? The first does not need it; the second should not use the tests. Had the author written an *Introduction* to his work, he probably would have answered these questions for the reader.

Rey's *Psychometrics* are presented in his third chapter. It deals mostly with general ability and performance tests; projectives are but grudgingly added to the list in a single paragraph. Specifically the tests are of two kinds, those that measure aspects of learning and those that attempt to discriminate responses to stimuli. Only five references appear at the end of this chapter. Since the book has no bibliography, what few references are found could take on some importance, but they come from widely different fields: Wechsler's *Measuring Intelligence*, Rey's own text on testing children, Nyssen and Delys' article on mental deterioration, Klineberg's *Race and Psychology*, and Ombredane's book on the use of the *TAT* in the Congo.

THE second part of the book furnishes *Examples of Psychometric Techniques Applied to the Clinic*. Six "original" tests are presented, with directions for their administration, with rationale and norms, but without any mention of their validity or reliability. Four of the six tests can be classified among the kinds known to most American psychologists, but the other two are novel.

There is a *Vocabulary Test* constructed on the basis of recall; two examples must be given by the testee for a given class of objects—like clothes, trees, footwear, boats, sicknesses—for a total of sixty classes.

Rapid Visual Perception of Jumbled Words is a timed test of retarded verbal development or of serious mental deterioration. Very little is reported on this item.

Rapid Visual Discrimination of a certain form within a repetitive design resembles some of the old *Attention Tests*. It explores the vagaries of individual perception and gives some indication of the individual's learning abilities.

A *Visual Maze*, where the testee attempts to follow zigzagging lines with his eyes, should explore both general and ocular motor control. The behavior of the testee is closely watched for psychological variables and his performance is referred to a scale of centiles. These scales, like those furnished for the other tests, give little if any description of the sampling population; in this case not even the size of the sample is given.


The other two tests could certainly furnish material for several research projects.

Following leads taken from the Binet-Simon scale and from Claparède, the experimenter uses four series of fifteen nouns in five presentations and a recognition exercise. It is a typical *Memory Exercise*, presented and studied in 53 pages of text. The administration is complex and difficult to learn, the norms presented are elaborate, and a detailed analysis runs into protocols and diagnostic categories, viz., organics, epileptics, psychopaths. It is the author's favorite and furnishes him with an abundance of idiographic material.

The last test, labeled *Dermolexie*, literally 'skin-reading,' uses tracings on the palms of the hands as its stimuli. This lies in the field of tactile perception—its range, its qualities, its implications, and its abnormalities. The variables found in this intriguing technique leave the reader concerned about its reliability, but fascinated by its possibilities.

This little paperback publication appears in the series edited by Professor Paul Fraisse; it gives the reader a glimpse of André Rey's methods and approach as a 'clinical psychologist.' Diagnosis is his purpose—in the service of medicine.





REWARDING SUCCESS

PERHAPS *CP* has no business talking about honors and homages when most of them are not rendered by books, but Littman, with his discussion of homage volumes, started the discussion (*CP*, Dec. 1958, 3, 356-359), and *CP* has been wondering ever since what a nearly total tale of the honors that come to psychologists would look like. So this once *CP*, giving up *liber* for *libertas*, is going to tell you part of what it knows about how psychologists get honored and how some of them have been. These are examples merely. *CP* merely wrote to eleven wise men and asked questions. It has made no systematic poll and is surely going to omit many important instances.

There is no use in repeating the examples for the nine items of Littman's list, though we may again name the categories.

(1) *Festschriften*, volumes in honor of a man, often on his birthday.

(2) Reprintings of the man's own contributions.

(3) Biographies of men, living or dead. Volumes of letters belong here too.

(4) Appointment to honorific offices—President of Something.

(5) Election to honorific societies.

(6) Receipt of awards and prizes.

(7) Appointment to special lectureships, sometimes coupled with the publication of the lectures afterwards.

(8) Appointment to named academic chairs.

(9) Presentation of honorific symbols, like books of letters or even gavels.

So much for Littman. Now what else are there?

(10) Honorary degrees. Littman omitted these as too capricious. They have this advantage: being so few in comparison with the population of equal merit, not so many feel hurt at being overlooked. Most awards mete out dis-

couragement as well as reinforcement.

(11) Naming an award for a man: Warren Medal in Experimental Psychology, Kurt Lewin Memorial Award, Karl Spencer Lashley Award in Neurobiology.

(12) Naming a lectureship for a man: Walter Van Dyke Bingham Annual Lecture, Richard M. Elliott Lecture, Lewis M. Terman Lecture, Ruth S. Tolman Lecture, Dorothy B. Nyswander Lectureship.

(13) Naming of a chair for a man: G. Stanley Hall Professor of Genetic Psychology, James Rowland Angell Professor of Psychology, Edgar Pierce Professor of Psychology.

(14) Naming of funds for a man: James McKeen Cattell Fund, G. Stanley Hall Foundation, Woodworth Fund for Experimental Psychology, Edwin G. Bor-ing Library Fund, Calvin P. Stone Loan Fund.

(15) Naming of libraries or collections of books: Warner Brown Collection, Stratton Collection, Brunswik Collection (all UCB); Dallenbach Research Library in Psychology (Texas); Samuel W. Fernberger Collection in Psychology, Miles S. Murphy Collection in Psychology (both UP).

(16) Portraits, statues, busts, and plaques. *Portraits*: Angier, Angell, Dodge, Yerkes, Hull, Miles (all Yale); Cattell, Woodworth, Poffenberger (Columbia); James, Münsterberg, Murray (Harvard); Titchener, Bentley, Weld (Cornell); Delabarre, Hunter (Brown); Langfeld (Princeton); Merrill (Stanford); Elliott (Minnesota). *Busts*: Wundt (Leipzig); Yerkes (Moscow); Freud (Clark). *Plaques*: Wundt (Leipzig); Warren (Princeton).

(17) Naming of laws and principles: Weber's Law, Müller-Lyer illusion, Zeigarnik effect, and hundreds of others.

(18) Naming of apparatus and tests: Galton whistle, König tuning-forks, Binet scale, Rorschach test, Skinner box, and many hundreds of others.

(19) Naming of laboratories and buildings: Walter S. Hunter Laboratory of Psychology (Brown), Franz Hall (UCLA), Howard Crosby Warren Laboratory for Psychology (Princeton), Charles Hubbard Judd Hall (Chicago), Hollingworth Laboratory (Barnard), Arps Hall (Ohio), Gesell Institute of Child Development (Yale), Morton Prince House (Harvard), Yerkes Laboratories of Primate Biology, Eno Hall (Princeton), Mezes Hall (Texas), and maybe later Tolman Hall (UCB). And where do we put the Frank Angell Athletic Field at Stanford?

(20) Naming of rooms or smaller units: Leonard Carmichael Auditorium (Brown), E. B. Delabarre Seminar Room (Brown), G. Stanley Hall Room (Clark), Herbert S. Langfeld Lounge (Princeton).

(21) Naming of geographical or political entities. Was not Berkeley a psychologist? Woods Hole names streets for biologists, but there are no psychologists unless you count Jacques Loeb of tropistic fame and Charles Otis Whitman, the Chicago zoologist who knew all about columbian behavior. Junipero Serra ought to be a psychologist.

(22) Orders, knighthoods, peerages, Geheiratwürde: Lord Adrian, Sir Frederic Bartlett, Herr Professor Dr. Geheirat Wundt.

That is the picture. Modern success culture, so strong in America, believes in rewarding success when there are rewards to be found. The American Psychological Association has just created three new awards for scientific contributions and the American Psychological Foundation a gold-medal award for a long career of service to scientific psychology. The rewards for success are uneven and capricious, it is true, and there is no control series to show whether departure from the null hypothesis is real. Nevertheless it is a good thing for these compulsive, competitive, American psychologists to be working in an atmosphere where the recognition of success is regarded as natural and proper and where it so often occurs. *CP* rather likes this undemocratic mass production of pedestals.

—E. G. B.

Humbert's Idiography

Vladimir Nabokov

Lolita. New York: Putnam, 1958. Pp. 319. \$5.00.

Reviewed by ROGER BROWN

Dr. Brown's absorbing interest in words makes of him a lexicolept if ever there was one—and certainly there have been, for Nabokov is another. No wonder Dr. Brown was fascinated by Lolita, this best seller; no wonder he has just published his book called Words and Things (Free Press, 1958). He writes here assessing Lolita "as an experiment in achieving psychological effects through the use of printed language." CP hesitated. Will this discussion of a novel and ingenious technique interest its readers? CP is never sure of its judgment when faced with idiography, ESP, or religion, fields which stress the particular and do not quite fit the normal nomothetic pattern of scientific psychology. In this case, CP decided not to be stodgy but to give its readers a chance. Here is a wise psychologist's enthusiastic comment on an adroit use of language that has intrigued thousands of readers. Dr. Brown, if you do not know, is Associate Professor of Social Psychology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. For more about him, see his earlier reviews (CP, Jan. 1957, 2, 26; May 1958, 3, 113-115).

How can a novelist give to a reader the impression of participation in a consciousness not ordinarily his own? The consciousness functioning in *Lolita* has more variety in more dimensions than the novelistic standard; it is a slippery, self-observant, sardonic mind operating under the dominion of a reprehensible passion. The author gives us the feel of this odd and extended consciousness by means of an exceptionally deliberate use of the resources of the printed language.

Lolita is about a man who is sexually attracted to girls of nine to fourteen

years or at least to certain fey specimens within this range whom he calls *nymphets*. The book purports to be the confessions of this man whose name is Humbert Humbert and, in the main, it concerns his relations with an American girl whose name is Dolores Haze but whom he calls Lolita. Humbert marries Mrs. Haze, a widow, in order to get close to Lolita and, when Mrs. Haze is accidentally killed, he carries off her daughter on a long motel-to-motel tour of America. Eventually Lolita runs away from Humbert with another nympholept, Clare Quilty, and several years pass before Humbert finds her again. Her abductor has deserted her long since, and Lolita is now married to an everyday young man and is carrying his child. Humbert obtains from her the name of his first rival, seeks him out, and kills him.

For the greater part of his life the primary force in Humbert's mind was his obsessive lust, and it operates in these memoirs as a ubiquitous force shaping the language. Its power is most apparent in the selection of metaphors. For Humbert, a telephone has "a sudden discharge of coins," a "spasmodic refund"; the alarm of a clock is forestalled by "pressing home its nipple." A clerk, in a store selling clothing for little girls, recites a list of fashion's hues: "Dream pink, frosted aqua, glans mauve . . ." Metaphors in a novel are often apt only in a general sort of way (e.g., a *shower of coins* from a telephone) and so convey nothing of the point of view of the protagonist. The objects and events of Humbert's world are not allowed to remind him of just anything; they are always selected by a state of mind and serve to place us in that state of mind.

Humbert's passion also operates on words, rummaging through their natural polysemy to find a congenial sense. For example, Papa-Lecher Humbert is at one point reluctant to allow Lolita to take part in a school play, and he tells her teacher that he will not grant permission unless "the male parts are taken by female parts." He does not say *unless the male parts are taken by females*, though the teacher apparently hears it so. The extra *parts* reminds us that this word means *privates* as well as *roles in a play*. This is a use of language particularly well adapted to Nabokov's purpose. The 'appended' *parts* is an unexpected addition to a phrase already conventionally complete, and so it conveys the alien intrusive quality of Humbert's passion. Not being detected by the teacher, it retains the privacy of obsessive thought. The language here is wonderfully witty in its concentration and in its mockery of Humbert playing the 'part' of an Old-Fashioned Papa who hesitates to let his little daughter participate in coeducational dramatics. Nor is it to be understood as the unconscious wit of a linguistic lapse but rather as a sly, outrageous joke of an extraordinarily self-conscious mind.

Humbert's desire, finally, accomplishes a sort of lexical fission in which words are fragmented into meaningful parts, many of which are not true structural units but are pseudo-morphemes created by Humbert's obsession. He notices, for instance, that a change of spacing transforms *therapist* into *the rapist* and that *fiends* is contained in *friends*. The reader soon picks up this habit and perceives, for instance, that an exchange of initial syllables in the names of the two English teachers, Miss Lester and Miss Fabian, is informative. Perhaps we should take this ability to shatter words as a measure of the force of Humbert's desire, but, probably, this particular feature owes more to Nabokov's history than to Humbert's. The author's native language is Russian and Russian is a language of much greater morphological complexity than English. Russian words can usually be analyzed into two or more meaningful components and Russian children, we know, regularly create words by recombining morphemes. A Russian-born novelist

should see morphemes in English that a native speaker misses, and there are examples of this splitting in other works of Nabokov where his style is otherwise very unlike that of Humbert.

It is a paradox of Humbert's style that his words are most directly sexual where the manifest events are not sexual at all. When there is something carnal to be described, Humbert's language is likely to go elaborately metaphorical, as when he writes: "The conjurer had poured milk, molasses, foaming champagne into a young lady's new white purse; and lo, the purse was intact." What has happened, in vulgar fact, is that Humbert, the fastidious literary gentleman, has contrived to have a playful romp with his landlady's daughter Dolores and this romp, which was only that to the child, has excited him to secret orgasm. For the most part, sexual events and sexual language are separated so that we regularly get simultaneous views from above and from below. This displacement spoils the book as pornography because, in pornography, as the author writes in his appendix to *Lolita*, "every kind of aesthetic enjoyment has to be entirely replaced by simple sexual stimulation which demands the traditional word for direct action upon the patient." Humbert's story is seldom titillating because it is seldom wholeheartedly and exclusively sexual.

THE important figures in Humbert's mind do not have fixed values or meanings. Like ambiguous figure-ground drawings they keep executing unwilling perceptual flip-flops. Nabokov suggests these changes of perceived character by changes of proper name. The assignment of appropriate names to fictional people is used to familiar comic effect in Jacobean and Restoration drama, e.g., *Sir Epicure Mammon*, *Sir Politic Would-Be*, *Doll Tearsheet*, and *Lady Wishfort*. Modern writers seldom construct names from morphemes in this obvious way, though they generally do select from existent proper names those of roughly appropriate connotation, e.g., *Rodney* for the rich-and-spoiled young man. In the ordinary novel, names, once assigned, are not

changed, but in *Lolita* each major figure has a nest of names and these are used to suggest the varied ways in which that figure can be conceived. Humbert sometimes even names himself in the third person, an appropriate shift, since a Life Space does indeed sometimes contain an 'objective' Perceived Self. Humbert's Self does not always look the same to him and so the name shifts between Edgar H. Humbert, Humbug, Hamburger, Humbert the Small, Humbert le Bel, and many others.

The most elaborate word game is played with the name of Lolita. She has many names and these represent her various incarnations in Humbert's mind. The trail begins with Humbert's childhood when he fell in love with his first nymphet. This girl-child's name was Annabel Leigh, a homophone of Poe's *Annabel Lee* which we cannot suppose to be an accident in view of Poe's lines: "I was a child and she was a child, In this Kingdom by the sea;" and of Humbert's sentences: "In point of fact, there might have been no Lolita at all had I not loved, one summer, a certain initial girl-child. In a principedom by the sea." Humbert sometimes spells *Lolita* phonetically as *Lo-lee-ta* and, in this form, it is clear that his later love reminds him of the earlier. Once, when he thinks she is lost to him, Humbert echoes Poe a second time, calling her *Lenore*. Sometimes, when she is thought of as a small child, he calls her *Lo*; as an odious bobby-soxer, all potato chips and juke boxes, she may be *Lola*; but in Humbert's arms her name is always *Lolita*, the affectionate, doting diminutive, providing the perfect expression of his desire. At the end of the book, married and "with that baby, dreaming already in her of becoming a big shot and retiring around 2020 A.D.," her name is *Dolly*. The *lee* syllable is still there but moved from its central position and deprived of stress. *Dolly* is a blowsy no-longer-young name suitable to "her ruined looks and her adult rope-veined narrow hands."

Always, of course, Lolita's real name is *Dolores*, and *Dolores* means *pain* or *sorrow*. That this is not an accident is clear from Nabokov's frequent use of the word *dolor*. The author has it in mind. The principal development in the

novel is Humbert's increasing awareness of the sorrowful side of his Lolita. At first his involvement with her is only sensual; she is his love *object* and he actually plans to enjoy her sexually while she sleeps under heavy Humbert-administered narcosis. Because our response is not tuned to the objective facts of the story but to their representation in Humbert's consciousness, we, with Humbert, have at first little compassion for Lolita. However, Humbert's consciousness is transformed in the final section of the book. He loses his detachment and fills up with pity and guilt. His awareness loses most of its variety because his involvement serves to fix values and meanings as cool reflection has not. Perhaps it is not too far afield to suggest that Lolita reverses the Undine romance in that a mortal acquires a soul through love of a nymph.

THE word *nymph* refers, most familiarly, to a class of lesser Greek divinities but, also, to the pupal or chrysalis stage in development. When a *nymphet* reaches the age of 14 years she must be transformed into a young woman, "the coffin of coarse female flesh within which my nymphets are buried alive." Some part of Humbert's frenzy must be attributed to his dread of this transformation which he expects to destroy his love (at one point he speculates on the possibility of breeding himself a supply of nymphets with Lolita as co-genitor). However, when the metamorphosis has been accomplished and Lolita is Dolly, a greater metamorphosis has been accomplished in Humbert: "and I looked and looked at her and knew as clearly as I know I am to die that I loved her more than anything I had ever seen or imagined on earth, or hoped for anywhere else."

What Humbert is depends on what Lolita is; his vileness is a corollary of her humanity. Once his love has hydrated Lolita into full life, Humbert is left with remorse. Clare Quilty is Humbert's brother stylist and nympholept. Like Humbert he quotes French phrases and plays with words and even overacts his own death agony. There is much to indicate that Humbert shucks off his own chrysalis, his humbug self, his umbra, in killing guilty Quilty.

Certainly the reader of *Lolita* is a very active participant. He is kept on the *qui vive* by the necessity of working out all the allusions and anagrams, taking in the metaphors, correctly registering the unexpected words, and keeping track of the metamorphoses of proper names. The curious thing is that all of this elaborate, vaguely Freudian, cryptanalysis teaches him nothing that he cannot learn from Humbert's explicit, self-descriptive statements. For everything about Humbert that is revealed by indirection is, in addition, 'verbalized.' This is a rather neat technique for representing a mind with insight. The indirect expressive channel from which we might expect to learn secrets of the Unconscious delivers messages that are wholly congruent with the character's self-reports. We appear to be participating in a mind that has no true Unconscious.

*L*OLITA is, I think, a genuinely startling novel. It has been assumed that this is because of the theme—a passion for little girls and a suggestion of incest. Certainly this is not an everyday theme, but twentieth-century readers have accepted topics fully as shocking and treatments far more lurid. Perhaps it is not so much the theme that startles and puzzles as the thoroughgoing violation of the conventions of the modern psychological novel. Humbert's troubles are not caused by an unwillingness to be aware of disagreeable truths. His self-perception is accurate and complete. But his state of psychic grace does not have the consequences we have been taught to take for granted. Fully aware though Humbert is, he does not understand why he should be what he is; nor can he accept what he is; and he cannot change. No flood of therapeutic insight will help Humbert. In fact, there is no help for him except the gratification of making art from his plight. In these respects the novel challenges the axioms of the Age of Psychology.



Those who do not know the torment of the unknown cannot have the joy of discovery.

—CLAUDE BERNARD

LSD—A Pot of Gold?

S. Garattini and V. Ghatti (Eds.)

Psychotropic Drugs. (Proceedings of the International Symposium on Psychotropic Drugs, Milan, 9–11 May 1957.) Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishing Co., 1957 (distributed by D. Van Nostrand, Princeton, N. J.). Pp. xiv + 606. \$19.50.

Reviewed by V. R. CARLSON

who is Acting Chief of the Section on Perception and Learning in the Laboratory of Psychology at the National Institute of Mental Health. He is an experimental psychologist, trained also in clinical psychology, and with a special interest in the visual perception of human beings and the effects of drugs on human visual perception and behavior. It may be, he says, that drugs to cure mental disorders will be found, and certainly we should remain on the alert to discover them if we can; nevertheless his real psychopharmacological faith lies in the use of drugs and their effects to come at a better understanding of the central nervous system and thus indirectly eventually to advance the battle against mental disorder.

I^N 1943 a chemist in Basel, Switzerland, discovered gold. It was not the first strike in the history of psychic drugs nor the last. Interest in the partially synthetic derivative of ergot, lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), spread widely, because it seemed to produce genuinely psychotomimetic symptoms—centrally, temporarily, and in the minute doses appropriate to the subtle mechanisms of the brain.

LSD does not occur naturally in the brain. But serotonin was found to be present in abundance, to be a powerful inhibitor of synaptic transmission, and, peripherally at least, to be effectively antagonized by LSD. An amazingly straightforward neurochemical model of mental aberration was almost possible. Complications, however, developed rap-

idly. A slight variation (2-brom-LSD) rendered the molecule much less potent psychically, yet it blocked the action of serotonin as effectively as before. Conversely, mescaline is known to have effects similar to those of LSD, yet it does not antagonize serotonin. It appears, too, that chlorpromazine may antagonize serotonin while reserpine releases it. Both have effects more or less opposite to those of LSD. At the same time it has become clear that LSD does not duplicate psychotic behavior in any exact manner.

Thus this drug begins a little to take on the perspective of various other psychically active drugs which at one time or another have appeared to hold the key to an understanding of the 'mind' or a cure for mental disorder but whose essential modes of action were never quite understood. None has yet proved to be 'fools' gold, however. Rather than becoming more confusing, the neuropharmacological model becomes more fascinating as it grows technically more intricate in depicting the complexities of centrally acting drugs—for the diverse yet interlocking techniques and knowledge of biochemistry, pharmacology, and electrophysiology have advanced to a point where, hopefully, psychological processes can now be postulated in terms of real events in the central nervous system.

This volume under review is an impressive, competent representation of current work with LSD and many other drugs, consisting of nearly fifty major presentations and an equal number of shorter reports by a total of 169 biochemists, pharmacologists, neurophysiologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists. They are concerned with discovering whether these drugs act fundamentally through interactions with epinephrine, norepinephrine, or acetylcholine, whether on cortical synaptic transmission or on the reticular system, whether as depressants, excitants, or releasers of inhibitory control. By and large the book is not one for a reader with a casual interest. The nearest thing to an overview of the field is Denber's discussion of drug-induced states and Delay and Deniker's categorization of tranquilizing drugs, but these two accounts provide hardly sufficient background to

keep the trees from obscuring the forest in much of the rest of the book.

The psychopharmacologist, physiological psychologist, or neuropsychiatrist will gain great profit here, not the least of which will be an acquaintance with some work which has appeared in foreign journals to which he may not have ready access. In the reviewer's mind an outstanding contribution is made by the inclusion of a number of papers which are clearly not preoccupied merely with cataloguing the behavioral effects of drugs on animals. These papers illustrate behavioral methodologies that utilize drugs as an adjunctive tool in the enterprise of investigating behavior in relation to the functioning of the central nervous system.

ANALYSIS of human behavior is something else again. "They take a pond for a puddle, and go to fathom it with a forefinger" (Reade, *The Knightsbridge Mystery*). Behavior is treated pretty much as a symptom, described by introspective reports, observational accounts, and references to explanatory concepts which are sometimes no more than circular restatements of the descriptions. There is the protest that these effects of drugs are only superficially similar to more naturally occurring psychopathological changes; but lurking in this proposition lies the implication that experimental modifications of behavior can never really add anything new to existing behavioral theory. Correction and refinement of theory can always be avoided by saying that a drug does not produce behavior appropriate to the theory. For example, dynamic theories of psychopathology do not exclude hallucinations from their purview. To argue that hallucinations are not an essential characteristic of schizophrenia is quite beside the point. In a controlled attempt to make a prediction about the hallucinations induced by mescaline, might not a new conceptualization of hallucination emerge—one more operationally satisfactory than its predecessors? Similarly, it may be true that an individual's reaction to a drug is a pattern of response to the total situation, which includes many factors other than the drug itself. The task would seem to

be to delineate the important factors and to show how they operate by varying them systematically. The reviewer is not suggesting that observational descriptions of behavior are not necessary initially and continually thereafter in any experimental approach to an understanding of behavior. They suggest what analyses to make. They do not constitute the analysis.

In any case this field is greatly in need of operational techniques for

identifying and measuring the essential characteristics and parameters of behavior. The principles of the methodologies illustrated in the animal experiments are not so obviously translated into appropriate techniques with human subjects. The lack of comparable drug experiments with persons represents an omission in the book under review, but the scarcity of such studies in general poses an opportunity and a challenge for both psychology and pharmacology.

Cro-Magnon Psychology for Managers

Lynde C. Steckle

The Man in Management: A Manual for Managers. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. Pp. x + 144. \$3.00.

Reviewed by ROBERT B. FINKLE

Dr. Finkle is Research Associate in the Personnel Division of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company in New York City. After a PhD from the University of Pittsburgh ten years ago, he has been associated with the Metropolitan in selecting personnel and recently in teaching the psychology of business and human relations at the Insurance Society of New York. He advocates humor, sincerity, honesty, and simplicity as prime facilitators of success in business.

IN 1947 Harper Brothers published a small volume of captioned cartoons entitled *Let's Be Human*, cartoons which lightly but effectively described seven simple rules for 'handling' people. More than half of *The Man in Management* consists of elaborations of these same seven principles. For these explications Dr. Steckle has drawn from his over 20 years of experience as teacher, businessman, management consultant, and psychologist. He acknowledges the college students, supervisors, foremen, managers, and executives as those to whom he is indebted for whatever effectiveness he may possess in communicating psychological fact to a

nonpsychological public. Though the 'facts' may at times be debated by his professional readers, the author shows unquestioned skill in communicating to laymen. Wisely he does not present this book as a panacea or a manual of pat answers for those seeking to improve their skills in human relations overnight. He claims instead that "if you are willing to broaden your knowledge of man and to develop the tolerance and patience that may grow from your increased understanding, then you have a chance of being helped." By bringing the seven principles to life in a quickly and easily read fashion, he seeks to persuade his readers in management to take them seriously and really to do something about them.

Dr. Steckle announces in his introduction that "we are not going to talk about individual differences, but we shall have a lot to say about individual similarities." This self-imposed limitation on the teaching of human relations is seemingly fighting with one hand tied behind your back. Nevertheless, thus handicapped, the author proves true to his promise. He leads each reader through a subjective exploration of his own presumed limitations as "a crea-

ture who is facing the complex and demanding issues of today with a 'Stone-Age' biology." He has chosen contrasts between Cro-Magnon and modern man, between the cave and the ranch house, and between man and shark to make the point that self-control is the most difficult, yet the most vital, aspect of good human relations.

The Man in Management seems to give the kind of advice which executives both expect and want to hear. The very readable lay-scientific setting of archaeology and physiology may im-

press budding men in management far more than formal dogma about drives, needs, wants, and individual differences. It may well be, therefore, that a few readers will actually modify their behavior, at least to some extent, in dealing with others. That is the often sought yet seldom seen objective in training in human relations. To the extent that Dr. Steckle's presentation effects these results he is to be congratulated. In any event his book should be a popular addition to the libraries on management as supplementary reading for the training programs in human relations.

many ways similar to that of Dollard and Miller, although the implications that he sees for psychotherapy deviate quite widely from what Dollard and Miller believe.

Wolpe's basic paradigm is as follows. Fear or anxiety as unlearned autonomic responses become attached by the conditioning process to neutral stimuli or to what may be called "pervasive stimuli." A resulting conditioned anxiety is thus attached to the neutral stimuli. In some cases the result is a "free-floating anxiety" which the author feels has been erroneously described by Freud and is in actuality an anxiety reaction that has become conditioned to such pervasive or relatively ever-present stimuli as buildings, darkness, ever-present conscious thoughts, etc. The anxiety condition itself may be the basis for the complaint or the basis of the complaint may be the behavior which has been learned in order to reduce the anxiety—drug-taking, alcoholism, obsessions. Hysteria presents a special case where responses other than autonomic are conditioned to the conflict or anxiety-producing stimuli. Not symbolism but specific present cues related to past experiences are responsible for the nature and locus of the hysterical reactions.

Neurotic behavior is "any persistent habit of unadaptive behavior acquired by learning in a physiologically normal organism. Anxiety is usually the central constituent of this behavior being invariably present in the causal situations" (p. 32). From this background Wolpe then proceeds to his principle of reciprocal inhibition: "if a response antagonistic to anxiety can be made to occur in the presence of anxiety evoking stimuli, so that it is accompanied by a complete or a partial suppression of the anxiety responses, the bond between these stimuli and the anxiety responses will be weakened" (p. 71).

The responses which are suggested by Wolpe as antagonistic to anxiety and readily enough available to the therapist to allow him deliberately to bring about therapeutic change are (1) assertive responses, the outward expression not only of aggressive behavior but also of friendly, affectionate, or dominant behavior (expressive behavior, acting out responses as a Freudian analyst

Substituting Good Behavior for Bad

Joseph Wolpe

Psychotherapy by Reciprocal Inhibition. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958. Pp. xiv + 239. \$5.00.

Reviewed by JULIAN B. ROTTER

Dr. Rotter is Professor of Psychology and Director of the Psychological Clinic at Ohio State University, but just at present Visiting Professor at the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author of Social Learning and Clinical Psychology (Prentice-Hall, 1954) and of many articles and chapters on human learning, personality and its measurement, and motivation. He is concerned with finding a systematic, psychological approach to personality theory and with the practical problems of psychotherapy and the description of personality.

IN the no-man's-land of psychotherapy, new techniques and new justifications for old techniques are eagerly sought. Some of the searchers will find a little of each in the present volume. Wolpe, who is a practicing psychiatrist and a member of the faculty of the University of Witwatersrand, South Africa, describes a method of psychotherapy which he has based on his understanding of psychophysiology and current behavior theory, particularly the work of Hull.

Taking a reductionist position, Wolpe begins his argument with a description of "the making and unmaking of functional neural connections," from which he moves to a behavioral learning theory, presumably after having established a neural basis for such a theory. His discussions of neuropsychology and of learning theory are sketchy, but his expressed intent is only to present some of the most relevant principles as more or less of a background for the main substance of his book, the exposition of psychotherapy based on the principle of reciprocal inhibition.

His neuropsychology, presented more or less as fact, would be considered by many as outmoded and controversial. Most of the learning work which he used to develop his thesis is taken from work with animals, particularly from his own studies of experimental neuroses in cats. These studies usually involved only a few animals in each experiment and his descriptions appear to this reviewer to be more anecdotal than experimental. Nevertheless, Wolpe's description of the basic process for neurotic behavior is in

would call it), (2) sexual responses, (3) responses of relaxation, (4) respiratory responses, (5) responses in the relief of anxiety, (6) competitively conditioned motor responses, (7) pleasant responses, in the life situation (and with drug enhancement), (8) emotional responses induced by the interview, and (9) abreaction.

This, then, is the bare outline of the theory which Wolpe uses as the basis for deriving his method of treatment. As in the case of many other therapeutic methods, the relationship between theory and the method of therapy is tenuous, based more often on analogy than on strict logic or on principles which can be invariably derived from a set of assumptions or tested hypotheses. Nevertheless there are some clear consistencies between his therapeutic methods and his theoretical orientation.

WOLPE begins his therapy with a history-taking interview. He is more concerned here with obtaining a 'social history' than in digging back into the past for repressed or hidden memories, although he does indeed find that such information can be useful. He writes: "for to overcome his neurotic reaction, it is of greater relevance to determine what stimuli do or can evoke them at the present time" (p. 105). He also presents oral questionnaires, or rather neurotic inventories that increase his information about symptomatology or neurotic behavior. His therapy is then structured to the patient in the general theoretical terms that have been described. The patient's reactions are due to persistent fear-responses that occur too often and too strongly, or to unadaptive stimuli. The object of the therapy is to produce other ways of responding to those stimuli that evoke the fear responses. The details of exactly how this end is accomplished are not fully explicated, although Wolpe provides considerable case information that describes the symptoms, and that tells what was attempted and the outcome. Apparently, he relies extensively on suggestion hypnoses, relaxation, and desensitization. Although he does not describe in detail the kind of relationship he achieves with his patients, some

such relationship must be used in order to get the patient to try out the suggested behaviors. The patient is urged not only in the therapeutic situation, but also in life situations, to try out and maintain these alternative responses.

Numerous reports of cases are included in the text, but the discussion of them is limited because they are primarily concerned with describing what Wolpe considered to be the stimuli that produced the neurotic behavior or unadaptive reactions, and the substitutive behavior attempted. There is here rela-



JOSEPH WOLPE

tively little discussion of broader conceptions of personality and an almost complete absence of terms describing such long-term goals or psychological needs as dependence, status-seeking, masculinity. The symptoms are presumably inevitable consequences of anxiety in a particular stimulating situation, rather than meaningful behavior directed at goals of which the patient may not be aware. Nor is it generally made clear why particular situations create conflict or anxiety, at least in any systematically predictive sense. Although Wolpe attempts to maintain a fairly consistent systematic approach, he leaves large areas unexplained. For example, he does not explain how hypnosis works or how and why stimuli may be ever-present in thought. He describes follow-ups in many cases in which the patient appears to maintain his improvement or 'get better, but he

does not explain why it is that new anxiety responses do not arise in new situations on account of the same conflicts that created the anxiety in the first place.

Of course, the important question is exactly how successful is Wolpe's method, and with what kinds of patients. On the basis of 210 cases, he reports about 90 per cent "apparently cured" or "much improved." He believes that this figure may properly be compared with the approximately 50 per cent typical for psychoanalysis. The average number of interviews (22) for his cases is much less than for other psychotherapeutic methods. Wolpe presents, in support of his therapeutic claims, some data on scores from the Willoughby Inventory before and after therapy. His tests are, however, given orally by the therapists with "explanations" of each item, and it is unknown how much bias may have gone into the patients' responses. It is doubtful that other therapists would accept Wolpe's criteria for cure or improvement; nevertheless his results cannot be easily dismissed. He would include in the conventional category of neuroses all the cases treated, and more than half of them he characterizes as anxiety states. Apparently he does not feel that the method is any more suitable for one class of neurotics than for another, including what the analyst would call the character neuroses.

This reviewer believes strongly that ultimately, as learning theory begins to be able to deal with the complex problems of human learning in social situations, such theory will form the base for our methods of psychotherapy. Such a theory, however, will have to provide not only knowledge regarding the process of learning but must also be combined with a large body of data and a language system in order to deal with the generalities of goal-directed behavior. The description of how human beings learn or what they learn that Wolpe presents seems to this reviewer inadequate and highly oversimplified. It does not explain satisfactorily how human beings learn in more simple situations and it is far from explaining the therapeutic changes which Wolpe himself obtains with his methods.

UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL,
SCIENTIFIC and CULTURAL
ORGANIZATION



INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE BULLETIN

A quarterly publication. Subscription, \$6.50 a year. Single copies \$2.00.

Just issued: Volume X, Number 4.

Part I: TECHNIQUES OF MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION

Forward by K. LIPSTEIN.

Mediation and Conciliation in International Law, by ELMORE JACKSON,
(with an introduction by JAMES N. HYDE).

Conciliation and Mediation in Collective Industrial Disputes, by PAUL
DURAND.

The Function of Conciliation in Civil Procedure, by CESARE BIGLIA and
LUIGI PAOLO SPINOSA.

Conciliation Proceedings in the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland,
Austria, Scandinavia, England and The United States, by HERGARD
TOUSSAINT.

Conclusions, by K. LIPSTEIN.

Part II: CURRENT STUDIES AND RESEARCH CENTRES

The Sociological Research Centre on Audiovisual Means of the Catholic
University, Milan, by A. McCLUNG LEE.

The Latin American Research Centre, Rio de Janeiro.

The Establishment of an Institute for Agricultural Colonization in
Ecuador.

The Sociology Division of the Institut Francais d'Afrique Noire, Dakar.

The Australian Branch of the Association of Social Anthropologists of
the British Commonwealth.

Research on Migration.

Now Available:

INTERNATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY, II.

Works published in 1956. Publishing date November 1958.
380 pages. (paperbound)

\$6.50

*Place your order for single copies or a standing order
for future volumes of this series with the:*

UNESCO PUBLICATIONS CENTER

801 Third Avenue

New York 22, New York

It appears to this writer that all of Wolpe's theorizing regarding the neural locus of learning, the nature of autonomic responses and of the conditioning process are not only controversial at best but are also more or less superfluous to what he actually does. One could say, after a careful reading of the wide variety of methods and the great variety of behaviors which he attempts to substitute for the patient, that he has one basic principle: when the patient presents certain unadaptive behaviors or symptoms, then other behavior, which the therapist considers to be more adaptive and possible to substitute in specific situations, should be taught directly to the patient by whatever method is possible. Apparently, what has frequently been referred to in the past as prestige-suggestion is the method he relies on most heavily. The patient is led to expect that his problems will be solved if he will but do as the therapist suggests, and at least in many cases the patient is willing to try out these behaviors, finds them successful, and so maintains them.

EXACTLY how successful this method may be, and with what kinds of cases, is still indeterminate; but there seems to be little doubt that Wolpe has been able to help many patients by his methods. In spite of what this reviewer regards as major weaknesses in Wolpe's theorizing, this is a serious book written by a serious psychotherapist. At a minimum it suggests that a highly direct method used by a therapist who accepts and wants to help his patient and who has a strong belief in the efficacy of his methods, a belief which he is able to communicate to his patients, can produce considerable changes in a patient's behavior. Frequently these changes may in themselves start a benign cycle and lead to lasting improvement. Whether or not Wolpe's method is satisfactory for use on all patients, whether as a method it is sufficient and thorough enough for any patient may still be problematic, but there seems to be little doubt that such short-term direct methods can sometimes produce lasting and beneficial changes.

The Century Psychology Series

Recognizing the growing interest in private practice in clinical psychology, this new text is the first to describe and analyze its varied aspects. Part I deals with the general preparation for private practice. Part II deals with the kind of people who are likely to apply for help. Parts III and IV discuss psychotherapy and the responsibilities of the psychologist. *To be published in Fall.*

Private Practice in Clinical Psychology

By
Theodore H. Blau

This interesting and varied collection of papers reveals the thinking in the field of psychology of an internationally known scholar. In this book, Dr. B. F. Skinner has collected thirty of his articles which he believes serve as a cumulative record of his work over a period of twenty-eight years. The selections have been culled from his contributions to magazines, technical journals, and books. *430 pages, \$6.50*

Cumulative Record

By
B. F. Skinner

This text sets forth a functional analysis of verbal behavior. It sketches the topography of verbal behavior in relation to its controlling variables; describes the manipulation of verbal behavior in the act of composition; and considers the activities involved in editing and in the creative production of behavior which are usually called verbal thinking. The ultimate aim is the prediction of verbal behavior. *478 pages, \$5.50*

Verbal Behavior

By
B. F. Skinner

Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.
35 West 32nd Street, New York 1, N.Y.

What Price Value?

Chris Argyris

Personality and Organization: The Conflict between System and the Individual. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. Pp. xiii + 291. \$4.00.

Reviewed by MASON HAIRE

Dr. Haire is Professor of Psychology at the University of California in Berkeley and also a Research Psychologist in that university's Institute of Industrial Relations. Like so many present-day industrial psychologists, he is a converted experimentalist. Exposed first to psychology at Swarthmore, he finally landed a PhD under Lashley at Harvard and then, via Aviation Psychology, found himself with the group that works on Industrial Relations at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. After early publications on learning, his published research has been concerned with testing morale, training, collective bargaining, and market research. His *Psychology in Management* (McGraw-Hill, 1956; CP, Mar. 1957, 2, 77f.) is an attempt to bring old-fashioned principles of psychology to bear on the problems of management. He has been a consultant to industries, the U. S. Air Force and its State Department. He has lectured extensively abroad.

THE problem of the book is the old, old problem of people working together in organizations. Whenever they do so, inevitably they give up some of the freedoms and satisfactions they had as individuals. On the other hand, presumably, they get something else back from the effectiveness of the totality that they could not have got as individuals. It is with this conflict the author deals. To do so he gives an admirably comprehensive review of research relevant to behavior in organizations, hypothesizes some causes for the difficulty, and even suggests some ways to run an organization so as to minimize the problem. Among the people who have dealt with this problem in recent

years, Argyris stands far to one side (is it right or left?) in his championing of the satisfactions of the individual.

Argyris is admirably suited for this task. A psychologist, working in the Labor and Management Center at Yale, he began some years ago by summarizing the existing research in human relations. He has continued his interest, both in theory and research, and is consequently especially well equipped now to tackle the problem.

There are, just now, a good many books on the problems of industrial organizations—"organization theory" is one of the fashionable topics. They present a spectrum of studies in the crucial area with which Argyris deals. At one end are the most traditional business approaches to organization theory—Urwick and Fayol, for example. Their statements are the 'how-to-run-it' variety; they give us neat, precise descriptions of the formal relations among people within an organization. They are never very explicit about what value is maximized by the best structure, but they provide a strong underlying emphasis on neatness, comprehensibility, and control. They do not speak of maximizing profits, and they certainly do not worry about how people are going to like being put into the slots they have set up for them.

Simon is a full step away from the traditionists. For him the problem of organization is the problem of decision—systems for collecting information, decision at appropriate levels, and structures for implementing the decisions made. The individual in such an organization *should* behave rationally, i.e., adjust his behavior to the organization's goals. This is a kind of modernized util-

ity notion, flowing in a sense from game theory, a system in which the organization's objectives provide scales of values along which the individual chooses maximizing strategies. No room is left explicitly in such a system for the individual's own goals and objectives which may produce quite other behavior. Simon deals with administrative behavior; the adjective rules out the conflict between individual and organization which is the central theme of Argyris' book.

Bakke—with whom Argyris works—most clearly stated the problem of the conflict some years ago in *Adaptive Human Behavior, Bonds of Organization, and The Fusion Process*. The last of these books does not so much, as its title suggests, spell out the fusion process as it sharply states the divergence between behaviors directed to individual satisfaction and to group objectives. To him goes the credit for the initial, sharpest statement of the conflict, and neither he nor anyone else has gone very far in resolving it either in theory or practice. Selznick's *TVA and Leadership and Administration* try to make the resolution by emphasizing the informal organization as a source of individual need satisfactions in conflict with the demands of the formal organization's objectives. The Lewinians, too, wrestle with the same problem under the head of group cohesion. Cohesion is the force that holds people in groups when the group makes unwelcome demands on them, limits their behavior, or frustrates their satisfactions. Sometimes people leave groups under these circumstances; sometimes they do not. When they do not, it is cohesion. What this force is and the conditions under which it operates seem to pose at the moment sticky and relatively fruitless problems, both theoretically and experimentally.

This, then, is the setting against which Argyris' statement appears. It is not an exceptionally novel statement, except in emphasis, but it is well presented and admirably documented. His starting point is clearly put: "There is a fundamental incongruence between the demands of the organization and the needs of healthy individuals" (p. 107). The organization demands subordination, dependence, and submissive passivity. The individual needs independ-

ence, self-actualization, and activity. In the nature of the case they clash.

It flows from human nature that the individual will work to actualize his unique organization of the parts. It equally follows from the formal structure that there will be an attempt to impose one big organization on all.

It is perhaps the author's prerogative to overstate the case a little to make the point clear. From time to time Argyris exercises this right. For instance, in discussing the demands of the organization, he says, "If a leader can be loyal to an organization under the conditions postulated above [i.e., technically competent, objective, and rational], there may be adequate grounds for questioning the health of his personality make-up" (p. 63). Leaving aside for the moment the circularity of the argument (the organization clashes with the healthy individual; if he fits in well he is unhealthy), surely this criterion would make even more unbelievably harrowing the estimates of the incidence of psychopathology in our population.

Again, on the same issue, Argyris (pp. 67-68) refers to evidence that in highly rationalized operations mental defectives may make the best employees (pp. 67f.). The point may be facetious; it is hard to be sure. I have heard it said that some branches of the Civil Service make jobs so simple that any damn fool can do them, thus broadening handsomely the labor pool on which one can draw. This is the first time, however, that I have seen such evidence cited as indicative of the nature of the organization.

To return to the thread of Argyris' argument: There is inevitable conflict. To the organizational principle of task specialization, Argyris counters with needs for self-actualization. To the principle of chain of command, he opposes the horrors incident upon dependency. Unity of direction is met by multiplicity of individual goals. In this situation, management tends to respond with 'stronger' leadership, rational incentives, and work plans, and with human-relations programs. The individual adapts by aggression, regression, withdrawal,



CHRIS ARGYRIS

rationalization, projection. The group adapts by restriction of output, unionization, and lowering group standards. All in all, it's a wonder anybody gets any work done.

In the face of these obstacles, three things are suggested to make the industrial organization work better: job enlargement, participative or employee-centered leadership, and "reality leadership"—i.e., flexible leadership tailored to the situation, not too nondirective, not too employee-centered, firm when it should be firm, and, like the song in *South Pacific*, broad where it should be broad. These desirable activities, in turn, are brought about by three kinds of development in the executive: (1) what Bakke called the "fusion process," of which more later, (2) diagnostic skill—the ability to see the 'private world' and motives of the other one—and (3) the help of the staff specialist. It might be pointed out that while they differ in form, in substance these points are not radically different from those made by McGregor in his brief but brilliant paper on *Conditions of Effective Leadership*.

Let us return to the 'fusion process' for a moment, for it contains one implication the organization theorists sel-

dom make explicit. As Bakke describes it, and as Argyris does (p. 211), "effective leadership is 'fusing' the individual and the organization such a way that both simultaneously obtain *optimal* self-actualization" (internal quotation marks and italics are Argyris'). This raises a nice point. Does it assume that both values can be at their individual maxima simultaneously? If it does, what becomes of the necessary conflict between organization and individual? Does it disappear in the ideally managed operation? I suspect that the simultaneous optimization means maximizing the two as far as it is possible, even though neither will be at the peak values that could be achieved by disregarding the other. If that is true, we give up some of each to get more of the other. The business is asked to reduce the accomplishment of its objectives to keep the employees happy.

Now one must be prepared to answer how much of the company's goal it is proper to surrender in return for how much individual satisfaction—a difficult calculus! Many people might be tempted to reply: "Let them be happy on their own time; they're here to work." To which the sophisticated human-relations expert replies that if they aren't happy they won't work so well. But right there the fusion argument collapses. We are really only trying to maximize one value—the company's. The individual's is only maximized to the extent that it somehow lubricates the operation or furthers the accomplishment of organization goals. The argument of the liberal humanist must be handled carefully here. He can stand forthrightly for the maximization of individual satisfactions, but, if he does so, he must be prepared to sacrifice some of the organization's goods. He must be careful of the seductively easy apology that the more human the value, the better the organization, or he will find the individual's satisfaction literally exchanged for the coin of the realm and he will have lost hold of the value in defending it. The only alternative to these two would seem to be a faith in a pre-established harmony to be sought out—a goal which seems even less likely of achievement in industrial organizations than it did in the original Leibnizian conception.

This problem of what we are trying to maximize becomes especially important as more and more people write about organization theory. Argyris does not seem to answer it quite clearly, but then hardly anyone does. He seems to feel we can spare a little from the organization to build up the individual. Others approach it differently, however. The human engineers, for example, begin with simple problems like the size of type and soon get to complex man-machine systems which develop into proper organization theories. Here the value that is maximized is the utilization of human capacities in accomplishing relatively narrowly conceived productive objectives. The sociologists tend to seek a maximization of institutional values flowing from the organization's position in a larger structure. Simon maximizes the rationality of decisions, and the mathematical elegance of Marshack's team theory and some of the Cowles Commission papers carry this point further. When the biologists get into social organization theory, it is usually through the concept of integrative levels, and the value maximized is more like the old-fashioned businessman's—it is integration and control. In this plethora of values we cannot simply speak of one or two. A framework for a theory of industrial organization must be a great deal broader than we have thought of it in the past.

ONE further point should be mentioned in setting Argyris' book in its historical context. The plea for more value for the individual and for freeing him from the organization falls into a quite popular stream of thought. *The Lonely Crowd* and *The Organization Man* are paperbacked parts of current folklore. Even the studies of conformity following Asch and Crutchfield, et al., become part of the popular horror story of the rapacious big organization. This seems to be a recurring fad in social philosophies, and as such it comes and goes. Most of us remember Charlie Chaplin in *City Lights* walking home from work still mechanically tightening imaginary bolts, an early victim of automation. Originally it was striking social satire. Fifteen years ago it would

have seemed irrelevant and pointless. Today it would be back in style. Some of the drive behind the human-relations movement and behind Argyris' plea for the rights of the individual seems to me to be part of such a cultural cycle.

Yet it would not be right to leave Argyris' book with no good word for the scholarship it embodies. He aimed at a theoretical framework and a review of the literature. The integrated report on research is admirable, and as nearly exhaustive as is possible in a field without clear boundaries. He cites something over 540 references, but it is not only the volume that makes them important. They are clearly and concisely reported and well woven into the fabric of his argument.

The book is one to be dealt with seriously. It covers the field broadly and raises important social problems. Surely it is too much to ask of a social philosopher that he also answer all the questions.

Narcotic Addiction: Fault or Malady?

David P. Ausubel

Drug Addiction: Physiological, Psychological, and Sociological Aspects. New York: Random House, 1958. Pp. 126. \$95.

Reviewed by VIN ROSENTHAL

who is Associate in Neurology and Psychiatry in the Division of Psychology of the Northwestern University Medical School, where he acts as Coordinator of the Clinical Training Program and as Chief of the Out-Patients' Psychological Services. He has been working with narcotic addicts and users for the last six years, at first in the Illinois Neuropsychiatric Institute and then in the Northwestern Medical School. You cannot treat drug addiction casually or quickly, he thinks he knows from long

experience; you have to work deliberately and patiently with them and then are not always successful. But the therapist has to understand the problem and the patient if he is to be successful ever.

ALTHOUGH written to correct "dangerously distorted" interpretations of drug addiction, Dr. Ausubel has here created his own partisan review of the narcotic literature. What the book gives us is expansive conclusions, based on a review in which the latest psychological reference cited by the author is already five years old at the time of publication. The author, Professor of Education in the Bureau of Educational Research at the University of Illinois, admittedly writes from limited first-hand experience: one year as Medical Officer in the United States Public Health Service Hospital, Lexington, Kentucky. Nevertheless the book is a critical, interpretive survey of the literature. Its intent is good: to present an integrated treatment of the problem of drug addiction; but its achievement is poor, for its level of scholarship precludes its serious consideration by students in the field. It is paperbound, but the paperbounds need not be superficial.

There are, as the reviewer observes the scene, two major approaches to narcotic addiction today. One group argues that addicts are primarily criminals engaged in an immoral activity. Their self-gratifying, euphoric experiences with narcotics, and the insatiable character of their drug needs, preclude their ever being able to function productively. This attitude argues further that drug addiction is a defect of character that makes the addict initially susceptible to addiction and accounts for his returning to drugs despite the harrowing experiences of his underworld life and the disruption of his personal and social growth. While this group recognizes that all addicts are different, it focuses on similarities of the majority comprising the addict population and looks toward social and legal preventive measures to stem the tide of addiction. Despite his attempt to compile a comprehensive text for students and professionals, Dr. Ausubel's book seems to reflect this approach.

An alternative view can be seen in

Marie Nyswander's *The Drug Addict as a Patient* (Grune and Stratton, 1956), and in the *Report on Narcotic Addiction of the American Medical Association* (1957). One finds here a stress on the multi-faceted motivational aspects of addiction, recognizing that "currently the immature, hedonistic, inadequate addict dominates the scene" but that addiction is "not a static but constantly changing affair." From this standpoint there is also recognition that drugs may have a socially adaptive function and that use of drugs need not prevent productive functioning.

DR. AUSUBEL discusses psychological and social factors which contribute to narcotic addiction. His chief contribution is a serious effort to integrate concepts in these areas with the known physiological facts of addiction, tolerance, and withdrawal. By limiting himself to the concept of *euphoria* as the main motivational ground for explaining addict behavior, the author achieves but a Procrustean solution. The facts under consideration fit nicely, but only at the expense of research findings not reported. The treatment of the question of "legalized addiction" is, moreover, handled much in the same way. There is no reference to H. S. Howe's *A Physician's Blueprint for Management and Prevention of Narcotic Addiction* (1955). The author's bias against drug use on the grounds that addiction is immoral—"It is morally indefensible for society to legalize a vice"—further demands that this volume be considered with caution. Understanding promotes tolerance; scientific psychology is essentially humane.

One can sympathize with the author's enormous task. Narcotic addiction is surrounded by an aura of ignorance and disgust. But epidemiological studies, such as those conducted since 1954 by the Research Center for Human Relations of New York University, and the others by D. L. Gerard et al. (*Post Hospital Adjustment: A Follow-up Study of Adolescent Opiate Addicts*, 1956), studies not cited by Ausubel, do indeed show promise for achieving the goal which this volume fails to attain.

Inconstant Man

Charles C. Anderson

Function Fluctuation. (British Journal of Psychology Monograph Supplements, XXX.) New York: Cambridge University Press, 1958. Pp. 104. \$4.00.

Reviewed by GEORGE A. FERGUSON

who is Professor of Psychology at McGill University. He learned about factor analysis and the theory of measurement from Godfrey Thomson at Edinburgh before 1940. He has been at McGill since 1946. He is a Past-President of the Canadian Psychological Association, and McGraw-Hill is shortly going to publish a book of his on statistics.

THE term *function fluctuation* was originated by Thouless (1936) to refer to day-to-day variation in abilities or in other attributes of behavior, as measured by psychological tests. Other terms, including Woodrow's *quotidian variability* (1932), have been used to refer to the same phenomenon. The author of the present monograph, now a professor of educational psychology at the University of Alberta, conducted his research at Cambridge under Thouless's direction. Thouless, as General Editor of the *British Journal of Psychology Monograph Supplements*, is also editor of this monograph. Thus Thouless in the roles of originator, director of research, and editor must share some part of the responsibility for the merits and demerits of this publication.

About one third of the monograph is devoted to a report of three experiments. These experiments involved the administration of parallel forms of tests separated by different time-intervals. The general idea is that if the correlations between forms administered close together in time are greater than between forms separated by a longer time-interval, then this difference may be interpreted as evidence of function fluctuation. Both cognitive and noncognitive tests were used. In one of the ex-

periments parallel tests of Verbal Intelligence, English, and Arithmetic were administered on seven occasions. The analysis of the data employed a criterion and an index of function fluctuation developed by Thouless, factor analytic methods, and the analysis of variance.

The author reaches a variety of conclusions. One experiment he interprets to mean that, "cognitive functions are liable to fluctuate, but they do so only occasionally and not invariably." The results of another experiment provide, he says, "overwhelming evidence" that cognitive functions do indeed fluctuate. He presents data on the differences in function fluctuation between different cognitive functions. One finding is that noncognitive functions fluctuate more than cognitive functions. Anderson is of the opinion that the occasional failure of similar experiments to agree, when conducted on different groups, results in part from function fluctuation.

While many of the conclusions drawn are clearly substantiated by the data, some of the statistical procedures used are open to question. For example, the author, without explanation, applies a test of significance to Thouless's criterion. It is not clear to me what the appropriate test would be. Other points of statistical criticism may be made. Nevertheless the research itself was competently conducted, and many of the findings are of interest.

About half of the monograph explores the concept of function fluctuation and reviews previous research. Here the author splits many a hair. He presents numerous quotations from the writings of other investigators, accompanied by his assorted commentary, evaluations, and argument. This dulls the reader when he attempts to follow the discourse in detail and exasperates him when he loses the thread. The author has even exhumed a number of dusty quotations from my own writing items that I hoped had been dead many a year. Surely the first half of the monograph could be substantially reduced without loss to the reader, and indeed with some gain.

The discourse at times appears jumbled and unintelligible. Read this: "Function fluctuation, although a hypo-

thetical construct, is not a fundamental psychological explanation, but a functional process, a kind of intervening hypothesis, which may be open to explanation by a resort to motivational terms." Do you understand?

This monograph is an easy target for criticism, a circumstance which unfor-

tunately makes difficult a fair evaluation of its research content. The fact is that Anderson has conducted a worthwhile piece of research, one which represents the most thorough investigation of the topic undertaken to date, but the account of which is poorly written and not clearly argued.

for an interchange of information, with the prospective group member assisting in the planning. He indicates his preference as regards the structure of the group, the impersonality of the content, and finally the topics for discussion.

The only apparent uniformity in groups lies in the attempt to achieve a desirable atmosphere. The leader conducts the group in the manner indicated by the members, using, in addition to discussion, the techniques of role-playing, personality and occupational inventories, self-appraisals, and sociograms. Driver describes her techniques as eclectic, ranging from seminar-type meetings to leaderless discussions. Routinely, the members learn about individual differences, adjustive techniques, and similar topics, and they devote their final group session and individual interview to evaluation.

Some might hesitate to use the same approach with the hospitalized mentally ill as with graduate students in mental hygiene, but it must be understood that Helen Driver is no novice in human relations work. Her interest in small groups arose when she saw its use in England for social, therapeutic, and rehabilitative purposes, serving there as a Red Cross Director during World War II. Her PhD research at Wisconsin was on small-group discussion, and her post-doctoral experience has included work with persons concurrently in individual psychotherapy with psychiatrists.

What appears to be uniformity in procedure is not so in reality. Although Helen Driver does not differentiate amongst the modalities of counseling, psychotherapy, and training, still she enables the members of her groups to choose freely the topics and the structure with which their current need and capacity permit them to cope. It is they who determine the degree of ambiguity, and the cognitive-conative balance, as Bordin puts it (Edward S. Bordin, *Psychological Counseling*, 1955). Implicit in this practice is the assumption that the client's preferences constitute a valid basis for a treatment or an educational plan.

The author gives credit to social psychology and psychiatry, rather than to psychoanalysis, for the basic principles of multiple counseling. Growth means

Brief Therapy with Small Groups

Helen I. Driver

Counseling and Learning through Small-Group Discussion. Madison, Wis.: Monona Publications, 1958. Pp. 464. \$7.00.

Reviewed by MILTON SCHWEBEL

Dr. Schwebel is Professor of Education in New York University and Psychologist in the Postgraduate Center for Psychotherapy. He has an AB from Union College, a PhD from Columbia, and a long experience in counseling, beginning in the Great Depression and employing group methods to save time. He acknowledges intellectual debts to the philosopher, Harold Larabee (Union College), the sociologist, Nathaniel Cantor (then at University of Buffalo), and the originator of counseling by interview, Socrates (Athens).

THE graduate student in many areas of psychology and education and the young practitioner will rejoice over the publication of this book. Those who have clamored for precise information on the procedures of conducting small groups as an instrument to personal growth will find it here.

Personal growth is broadly defined to embrace the behavioral changes that occur as a result of a great variety of educational experiences as well as counseling and psychotherapy. No wonder that the method of multiple counseling—small-group discussion accompanied by occasional sessions of individual counseling—is applicable to the diverse situations reported here. Experienced workers are almost sure to find an illustration of the use of the techniques in their own specialty in some one of the 39 contributions that compose Section

II, the Symposium, where the subjects of group activity range in age from primary-school children to the aged, and, in character, from under-achievers, pre-delinquents, alcoholics, and prisoners to theological students, teachers, industrial leaders, and mental hygiene workers. This diversity is evidence of the extent to which group methods have come to be applied to human problems, particularly during the last decade.

Even the most sophisticated worker is likely to learn from someone who, like Helen Driver, has systematized her methodology and who has had the courage, in this era of ambiguity and loosely structured professional interpersonal relationships, to spell out the details of a program that is as rigid or loose, as intellectual or affectual in content, as personal or impersonal as the members of the group choose it to be. This forms the content of Section I, which is a reprint of the author's earlier *Multiple Counseling* in 1954.

MULTIPLE-COUNSELING groups consist of about 8-10 persons who share a common interest, such as high-school seniors who want to learn about "getting along with people," or maladjusted college students who feel inadequate and seek help from university counselors and psychiatrists. One of the minimum of two full-length interviews precedes the first meeting of the group and is used

movement from egocentricity to social participation and contribution, and human relationships are used as the learning instrument. It is not surprising that one finds, in the many excerpts and summaries given, a supportive quality, an emphasis on the positive qualities, together with encouragement of individual responsibility and autonomy. In Wolberg's terms, multiple counseling has supportive and educative-reeducative goals but it makes no pretense at personality reconstruction (Lewis R. Wolberg, *Technique of Psychotherapy*, 1954).

THE 39 articles in Section II follow a pattern. Each reports the setting, the purpose, the process, and the results. Consequently there is less of the unevenness one ordinarily finds in an anthology, and there is a tendency toward brevity. The chief variation appears to be the quality of the evaluation, which ranges from the impressions of the leader all the way to controlled experiment—as in the case, e.g., of Professor Misumi, Japanese translator of Driver's *Multiple Counseling*. Yet it must be said that the author pays consistent attention to evaluating the results and exhibits a general, though not uniform, tendency to avoid overstatement.

A few of her brief reports are especially timely—among them those that show the use of small-group activity to solve a desegregation problem. With the current research on teaching methods in college, methods that encourage student initiative like those supported by the Ford Foundation, the several papers on the application of multiple counseling to the classroom become clearly pertinent. There are two reports on use of the group process with older persons.

Any treatment as brief as 10–20 hours that seeks to achieve personal growth carries the implicit assumption that qualitative changes in attitude and behavior are achievable quickly. Driver's evidence of accomplishment is impressive, although most of it is subjective, depending on the subjects' self-evaluation and on the leader's. Other reports, however, came from such third-party sources as the psychiatrists. One fact, the low drop-out rate, is especially im-

pressive. Water at low temperature requires only minor quantitative change for transformation to ice. The question is what problems of man are amenable to qualitative change by the kind of brief relationship that could be available to larger numbers than are our current therapies.

This book fills an empty niche in the literature of the group process. There are volumes on theory and research in group dynamics, on group guidance with emphasis on educational-vocational planning, on more dynamic methods of teaching and administration, on psychotherapy, but there has been until now no complete work on group counseling or brief therapy with small groups that has such wide application.

Durkheim on Ethics and the State

Emile Durkheim

Professional Ethics and Civic Morals. (Trans. by Cornelia Brookfield.) Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. Pp. xlv + 228. \$5.00.

Reviewed by BRUCE J. BIDDLE

who is Associate Professor of Education in the University of Kansas City, where he is also director of a research project on teaching roles. He is a social psychologist and a bit of a sociologist, with a PhD from the University of Michigan, and a special interest in leadership and social expectation.

EMILE DURKHEIM (1858–1917) is a monumental figure standing at or near the head of at least three of the social sciences. It was Durkheim who first insisted that there was a new level of molarity (sociology) applicable to the study of social interaction, that societies possessed an organic unity and could be studied in historical patterns (anthropology), and that one must seek for the social causes of human behavior,

as opposed to the individual, in order to truly understand and predict behavior (social psychology). It was also Durkheim who insisted that the social scientist had a moral responsibility to his society, and that the new science (sociology) could serve the state by providing a study of probabilities resulting from social facts, conditions, ethics, and morality.

It is appropriate, then, that Durkheim now comes forward in still another guise, that of a political scientist. *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* consists of a number of lectures which Durkheim prepared and presented between 1890 and 1900. Since several courses of lectures are involved, the printing history of this material varies, but none of it has before now appeared in English.

DURKHEIM first takes up the problem posed by classical economics: Why should economic institutions have a claim to self-regulation resulting from the uncontrolled actions of individuals (and thus seek to avoid regulation of economic activities by the state), when all other institutions recognize ethical and moral responsibilities incumbent on the individual? Durkheim concludes: (1) That economic institutions need as much supervision (for the public good) as do any other institutions. (2) That the peculiarities of classical economic theory have resulted from historical accident. (3) That institutions, generally, adopt supra-individual means of self-regulation which are supported by the state. (4) That an appropriate (indeed, the only appropriate) method of control of economic institutions would be through a resurrection of the guild system suitably modernized. This suggestion (also advanced in *The Division of Labor*) is based on the twin assumptions (a) that the basic method of social control is that of primary relations, and (b) that institutions of control must also be tied to the state for the good of the general public. (It is interesting to speculate what Durkheim would think of the industrial union as a method of economic regulation. I suspect that he would appreciate its effectiveness both in functional and moral integration but

would decry the separation of interests of management and labor and would approve the cooperative movement.)

Next Durkheim turns his attention to the form of the state. He finds that the words *democracy*, *monarchy*, et al. refer not to the numbers of persons governing, but rather to the existent patterns of communication between state and person. Specifically, he offers two conditions characterizing a democracy: (1) it exhibits a wider range of concern for problems among governmental institutions, and (2) it shows a closer pattern of communications between governmental institutions and persons. Thus, a strong central government may be just as democratic as a weak one, provided only that it meets the qualifications discussed. (These ideas seem remarkably modern and certainly apply to our present concerns over the functions of the federal government.) Durkheim also recommends a representative government founded on professional rather than regional groups.

Our author then turns to a number of typical questions of the enlightenment: fundamental human rights (the state exists for the advantages of social life and both creates and enforces morality), the rights of property and contract, and how these have become established in various societies. As always, his emphasis is upon the dependence of the individual on the collective, and upon the social determination of behavior.

THERE are a number of reasons, some of them trivial, that make Durkheim difficult to read. Beyond these latter, Durkheim appears as a brilliant pioneer who attempted to express hypothetical constructs in sociology without the conceptual tools that modern theorists have at their disposal. It must be remembered that he was burdened by the Newtonian physics and by the enormous impact that Darwinism was then having on Western thought, that he lacked the ideational tools of the hypothetical construct, the conceptual and operational definition, and the independent-intervening-dependent variable framework. Durkheim was strongly convinced that social life has a supra-individual exist-

ence which can be described, about which reasonable propositions can be stated, and which is the only level at which one can predict social behavior. Yet, when forced to defend sociology as having a separate existence apart from and above that of psychology, he burdened himself with a whole raft of psychological terms used, anthropomorphically, for social phenomena. Thus *consciousness*, *unconscious*, *thought*, *sentiment*, *idea* and the like apply just as often to group behavior in Durkheim's writings as they do to individual behavior. In using these terms Durkheim denoted a similarity between certain functions of the physiological and social organisms, but he badly confused his contemporaries. And he continues to confuse the modern reader by dragging along a welter of connotations (e.g.,

group mind) which he never intended.

One must read Durkheim 'in translation'; that is to say, by transposing his thoughts into modern terms. When this is done, one is impressed by the contemporaneity of his problems, the insightfulness of his comments, and the fact that we are still struggling in our present-day political institutions with the very issues which he raised. I would not recommend this book as an introduction to Durkheim (*The Rules of the Sociological Method* is better); it is neither a unique example of Durkheim's thought, nor is it light reading. It should certainly be in the library of the serious Durkheim scholar, and it will provide a wealth of insights for the student interested in political sociology, the sociology of law, and the ethics of social action.

Discrimination without Prejudice

George Eaton Simpson and J. Milton Yinger

Racial and Cultural Minorities: An Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimination. (Rev. ed.) New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. Pp. xi + 881. \$7.50.

Reviewed by SEYMOUR FESHBACH

Dr. Feshbach is Associate Professor of Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania, where he has been since 1952. His PhD at Yale a year earlier got him interested in the dynamics of personality, attitude change, as well as clinical testing. His research is concerned now with the dynamics of hostility, including its relation to social prejudice.

IN the five-year interim between the first publication of Simpson and Yinger's treatise on minority groups in the United States and the appearance of this second edition, the Negroes of Montgomery, Alabama, have participated in a nonviolent boycott of segregated buses, the high schools of Little Rock, Arkansas, have been defiantly emptied, and the Congress of the United States has decided that the right to vote is a matter in which the Federal Gov-

ernment has some concern. The rapid changes, indicated by these and related events, in the Negro's position in American society provide the basis for the revision of the original publication.

This second edition adds almost 100 pages to what had already been a rather encyclopedic text and is *au courant* (circa 1957) with research progress as well as with social changes in the area of ethnic and racial discrimination. Thus, in the present edition, the treatment of the Authoritarian Personality takes cognizance of the Hyman and Sheatsley critique and also of several recent investigations of the correlates of the E and F scales. Similarly, recent studies of interracial housing, intermarriage, and other aspects of intergroup relations are included in the later volume. The extensive descriptive or historical material has also been brought

up to date. In particular, the consequences of a number of Supreme Court decisions, highlighted by the 1954 decision upsetting the 'separate-but-equal' doctrine, are thoroughly discussed.

Basically, however, the two editions are quite similar. The three principal parts of the book remain the same: (a) causes and consequences of prejudice and discrimination, (b) institutional patterns of minority groups, (c) reduction of prejudice and discrimination. So do the chapter headings and much of the chapter contents. The virtues and limitations of the first edition are present to an equal degree in the second. In each edition, the authors have achieved a lucid and engaging style without oversimplifying issues or avoiding technical material. They are clearly at home in both empirical and theoretical sociology. Although one may disagree in some instances with their choice of material, Simpson and Yinger, nevertheless, have done a workmanlike, scholarly job in bringing together from diverse disciplines data bearing upon intergroup relations.

The inclusion, however, under a single cover of material from psychology, law, anthropology, economics, political science, the arts, etc., does not, of itself, satisfy the authors' goal of synthesis, "of relating the various analyses to each other and to a systematic group of principles that underlie them all." Indeed, their attempt falls far short of this goal, chiefly, perhaps, because there is not yet in 'behavioral science' a core of constructs and principles that permit the incorporation under a single conceptual scheme of information stemming from the various disciplines concerned with human behavior. A greater fault is the authors' neglect of relevant theory and data. For example, they make no use of theories of attitude change, conformity processes, self-evaluation, or conflict, though each is intimately related to the maintenance, expression, and modification of prejudiced behavior.

THIS lack of an adequate theoretical structure leads to inconsistencies that might otherwise have been avoided. Thus the authors adhere to the use-

ful distinction between the attitude of prejudice and the act of discrimination. They place considerable emphasis upon the possibility of modifying discriminatory behavior while the feelings of prejudice persist unchanged. However, since they fail to attribute any systematic mediating properties to the notion of prejudice, the distinction between prejudice and discrimination is essentially lost. The response to a pencil-and-paper test, the act of accepting a reservation for an interracial party, and the act of seating an interracial group are all said to represent equivalently the 'true' attitude of the respondent. By adopting this position, one can readily eschew problems pertaining to the measurement of prejudice and so it is that the matter of scaling social prejudice is nowhere discussed. The work of Thurstone, Likert, and Guttman is neither cited nor are the issues they raise dealt with. Nevertheless the ghosts of validity and reliability remain restless and they demonstrate their potency in such comments of the authors as "One may wonder whether a social-distance scale is a valid measure of 'ethnic hostility.'"

Having suggested the addition of new material to an already lengthy volume, the reviewer may properly make some recommendations for deletions. That section of the text describing the historical background and the institutional characteristics of minority groups might well have been given less emphasis. In particular, the chapter dealing with *Minorities and Art* could easily have been eliminated without much loss to the rest of the volume. The treatment of this topic is prosaic, for a sizable part of the chapter consists of the recitation of the names of minority-group artists and the titles of their artistic efforts.

It is inevitable that the treatment of an area as complex as prejudice and discrimination, where the basis for social action still depends more on opinion than on evidence, will elicit objections. The book has its shortcomings; nevertheless the revised edition is, on the whole, an excellent text. While directed toward the mature undergraduate, graduate students may also profit from this solid and, in many ways, sophisticated approach to a controversial and difficult topic.

Problem Solving is Best

Norman R. F. Maier

The Appraisal Interview: Objectives, Methods and Skills. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958. Pp. xiii + 246. \$5.95.

Reviewed by W. J. E. CRISSY

who is President of Personnel Development, Inc., consultants to management. They set up programs for executive development and conduct training sessions on appraisal interviewing. Dr. Crissy himself has been responsible for considerable research on interviewing. He is a Diplomate in Industrial Psychology. He and Harold C. Cash are co-authors of Psychology of Selling, a series that has now reached volume 4 and does not stop there.

THEOREM: Any employee in any business is likely to be better motivated to perform his duties if he has answers to these two questions:

What is expected of me?
How am I doing?

This book is devoted to studying the most commonly used medium for providing the answers—the appraisal interview, which is an interview conducted by the line supervisor with every employee reporting to him.

The author distinguishes three methods or patterns of appraisal interview: *Tell and Sell*, *Tell and Listen*, and *Problem Solving*. The primary objective of the first two is employee development. The third focuses upon improved job performance.

Since the purpose of this book is both demonstration and analysis, about half of its contents consists of protocols of role-played interviews that illustrate the three methods. So that comparisons among the methods can be made, a single case is used and two interviews per method are reported. Analysis is based upon the reactions of the participants, the comments of the observers,

and the study of the interview protocols—word count, percentage of total words attributable to interviewer, number of 'speeches' by interviewer and interviewee, number of interruptions, etc.

What were the findings?

Tell and Sell. Success of this method depends on the persuasive skill of the interviewer. In neither demonstration was the employee convinced of the fairness of the evaluation. Little opportunity is afforded for catharsis; frequent interruptions by the interviewer occurred. In attempting to gain the employee's acceptance, the interviewer may offer incentives that he cannot provide. More words and hence more time are required by this method than the other two. *Tell and Sell* contributes least to change of attitude on the part of both the employee and the supervisor.

Tell and Listen. As in the case of *Tell and Sell*, the interviewer plays the role of 'judge.' This method, however, provides for a release of defensive feelings by the interviewee. It places a premium on the interviewer's skill in listening and reflecting feelings. Whereas *Tell and Sell* is more exhortatory, *Tell and Listen* is more nondirective, à la Rogers. The 'speeches' in these interviews were about half as long as in those illustrating the first method. Further, the interviewer spoke 56 per cent of the time, as contrasted to 82 in the *Tell and Sell* method.

Problem Solving. In this method the interviewer's role is as helper rather than as judge. Problem-solving behavior is elicited in the interviewee. An underlying assumption is that sound appraisal is based primarily on *results achieved* as compared with *results expected*. Focus in the illustrative interviews was, therefore, upon job improvement rather than upon traits of the interviewee. In both illustrative interviews fewer words were used, 'speeches' were far shorter, the interviewer spoke far less than was the case with the other methods.

In his discussion of the three methods of interviewing Maier says, "The method assigned to the interviewer seems to exert considerable control over his behavior. Since the method specifies an objective, it is apparent that the skills an interviewer will practice depend not only upon his interviewing ability and knowledge, but also upon the

assignment he is given. . . . Whether an interviewer listens or preaches, dominates or draws out, understands or explains, is patient or irritable, etc., depends partly on the objective he is asked to pursue."

INDUSTRIAL psychologists may say that the *Tell and Sell* method and, perhaps also, *Tell and Listen*, are 'straw men,' that, of course, the *Problem Solving* method is the one to espouse. Help the man to help himself. It has been the reviewer's observation, however, that line executives too frequently attempt to mold subordinates in their own image. Their coaching and counseling often consist of telling and exhorting. Also, in many companies personnel evaluation is

strictly in terms of personal qualities rather than in terms of job performance measured against agreed-upon job standards. If this book served no other purpose for the industrial practitioner than to dramatize the pitfalls of improper appraisal interviewing, it would justify its existence. The benefits to be gained from reading it far exceed, however, the one cited above and readership should not be restricted to industrial psychologists. Anyone interested in the dynamics of interpersonal relationships is likely to find the discussion rewarding and refreshing.

The Appraisal Interview is thus a welcome addition to the other contributions made by Maier and his colleagues at Ann Arbor for a better understanding of human behavior in the industrial setting.

The Enigmatic Hindu

G. Morris Carstairs

The Twice Born. London: Hogarth Press, 1957. Pp. 343. \$6.75.

Reviewed by SOHAN LAL SHARMA

Dr. Sharma is a Hindu by birth and early training, a clinical psychologist with a PhD from the University of Michigan in 1956. He has since worked at a State Hospital in Iowa, at the Menninger Foundation, and in the Department of Pediatrics of the University Hospital in Ann Arbor, Michigan. For the past three years he has been studying the Rorschach responses of Hindu students and the changes in the structure of their personalities as they become accustomed to living in the United States. Now he is working at the Los Angeles Psychiatric Service.

DURING the past five years social scientists have provided us with an outpouring of works concerning the cultural, political, and economic dimensions of Indian (Hindu) life. Yet the present book is the first to appear on the psychodynamics of the social group referred to in India as 'Caste-Hindus.' This fact alone would suffice to make

the work a significant contribution, but it is interesting also because it reveals at once the advantages and the drawbacks that confront the person who studies the psychodynamics of a foreign culture. Though it is likely that a 'native' would not have achieved so high a standard of objectivity, it is equally probable that he would not, like Mr. Carstairs, have fallen victim to a number of fundamental oversights. Nevertheless, whatever their limitations, it appears historically inevitable that at this juncture we shall have to depend primarily upon western scholars for our sociopsychological understanding of underdeveloped countries, where training in the social sciences still constitutes a luxury.

The author of this book is an English psychoanalyst whose parents were Presbyterian missionaries in the province of Rajasthan, India, the site of the present study. He was born in India and spent his childhood there, speaking the native dialect of Hindustani. He was

educated in England, where later he obtained his analytic training. In 1951 he returned to Rajasthan, to study "what sort of peoples the three upper castes of Hindu society, the Rajputs, Baniyas, and Brahmins, were." Essentially, he attempts in this volume to portray the differences in psychic structure among the three castes.

The author also proposes to show the general psychodynamics of what is called in India the 'Caste-Hindus.' He held long interviews, stretching over periods of many months, with each of his informants who identified themselves as belonging to one of the three upper castes in that community. Essentially, his basic conclusions are taken from these interviews. He also made use of psychological tests (Raven's matrices, Rorschach, word association tests) for exploratory purposes and to validate his observations.

To understand the Hindus one must know their religion well, since it pervades every aspect of their lives. Yet the weakest chapter of this book is the one on *Religion and Fantasy* in which the author virtually ignores the basic tenets of the religion—among them the transmigration of the soul, the relationship between Atma (soul) and Paramatma (Supreme soul), Pap (sin), and Punya (virtue or goodness). Hence the role that religion plays in ego and superego organization, its contribution to attempts at adjustment to external reality, is neither properly assessed nor well explained. This deficiency is felt throughout the book, since the superstructure of the modal Hindu personality, if we may speak of such a concept, is perhaps to be found more clearly in Hindu religion than in any other aspect of Hindu life. Because he fails to make the distinction, the author confuses the private religious fantasies of his subjects with the consensual aspects of Hinduism, thereby leaving the reader in doubt about which of the two is being discussed at any point.

The orientation of the book illustrates a view characteristic of those earlier psychoanalysts who attempted to account for complex social structures by reducing them to early infantile con-

licts, thereby neglecting other major relevant variables. This book tries to characterize Hindu culture solely in terms of the psychic conflicts of the male child in the first two years of his life. The thesis is that the Hindu male child is indulged by the mother until he is about two years old. Then, suddenly, she withholds gratification from him; the child is disciplined. He experiences this change as a 'betrayal' by his mother. In consequence he recreates his world of fantasy as it existed before the 'betrayal.' And then, throughout his life, he attempts to regain this lost bliss. Thus he creates external symbols, rituals, gods, etc., and endows them with powers and intentions like those he once attributed to his mother.

The role of a female child, her conflicts and fantasies, are said to play little part in Hindu culture.

Other studies dealing with Hindu personality-structure and the Hindu child-rearing practices do not quite support such observations and conclusions. (Beth C. Kennedy, *Rural-Urban Contrast in Parent Child Relations in India*, *Indian Journal of Social Work*, 1954, 2, 162-174; Gardner Murphy, *In the Minds of Men*, 1953.) These studies show that the trauma through which a Hindu child goes is neither so early in his life nor so severe in nature.

THE community upon which the study is based probably comes as near to being a closed and primitive society as it is possible to find in India today. If the strict prescriptions of the Vedic Code still govern the affairs of this community, significant differences must be expected in the intelligence levels, the educational standards, the levels of aspirations, the child-rearing practices, and the anxieties and phobias among the three castes. In fact, however, such differences were not found. All subjects, moreover, regardless of caste-identification, aspired to some form of release from the cycle of birth and rebirth (Moksha). This wish persisted in spite of differences in the detailed content of fantasy which led Rajputs to cherish bravery and chivalry, Baniyas to covet wealth, and Brahmins to strive for inner peace. Nor do these differences,

which are held to be basic, contradict what is in fact the major finding, had the author but recognized it, that fundamental caste distinctions, as prescribed by the Vedic Code, no longer exist.

Perhaps a more fruitful way of studying the dynamics of Hindu society would be to contrast the three upper castes (Brahmin, Rajput, and Bania), among whom significant personality differences appear to be lacking, with the Untouchables (Shudra), for it is between these two groups that the fundamental caste line is still more rigidly drawn.

Nevertheless the book is marked by sensitivity and insight in its perception of the Hindu community and of the interpersonal relationships. The relationships between siblings, spouses, and peer group members are vividly portrayed. The description successfully captures the Hindu's concern with his body, the rituals and phobias attached to it, and, in general, the part that physical preoccupation plays in the daily scheme of things. Thus the account succeeds admirably in its descriptive aspects, while leaving much to be desired in the dynamic possibilities.

It remains true that this study is a pioneering work. It is a first attempt at a detailed and theoretical study of the psychodynamics of 'Caste-Hindus.' Its use of psychological tests, moreover, though hampered by cultural limitations, does indeed serve to show more objectively than has been done heretofore the similarities and differences in value-orientations among Hindu groups. This attempt might have proved even more successful had the author used the TAT (thematic apperception test), which would have brought out the differences in the fantasy life of his subjects. His study also suggests numerous leads and hypotheses for further investigation in the area of culture and personality.



Things and actions are what they are, and the consequences of them will be what they will be; why, then, should we desire to be deceived?

—JOSEPH BUTLER

A GLOSSARY OF SOME TERMS USED IN THE OBJECTIVE SCIENCE OF BEHAVIOR

By

WILLIAM S. VERPLANCK

Provides an empirical vocabulary in the science of human and animal behavior

Familiarizes readers with developments in the study of animal behavior

Clarifies concepts used by behaviorists and ethologists

Price \$1.00

Order from:

**AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION**

**1333 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington 6, D. C.**



ADOLPH MANOIL
Film Editor

SPACE PERCEPTION

Living in a Reversed World

Theodor Erismann and Ivo Kohler, University of Innsbruck, Austria. English dialogue and narration by James J. Gibson, Cornell University. 16 mm, black and white, sound, 12 minutes. Available through Psychological Cinema Register, University Park, Pa., \$60, rental \$2.75.

Reviewed by JOHN F. CORSO
The Pennsylvania State University

The study of space perception is one of the oldest and one of the most fascinating topics in the history of psychology. It concerns perceptual behavior as it relates to the size, shape, and distances of objects and their extensional relationships to an observer. As psychologists, we are primarily concerned with space as experienced, rather than space as conceptualized in Euclidean or non-Euclidean geometries.

This production deals with the perception of left-right and up-down relationships as learned behaviors. The film asserts that, since organismic movements take place in space, motor behavior may be interpreted as space perception. "Seeing depends on the body sense or touch." Unfortunately, no extended explanation of this view is given, nor is it clearly indicated that kinesthesia provides the individual with cues related to the static and dynamic conditions of the muscles and, therefore, of the position and activity of body parts. Under normal conditions, such movements are experienced as spatial in character.

The film does reveal, however, that space perception has its beginnings in early childhood, in the learned coordinations of hands and eyes. These coordinations in adult subjects are shown to be disturbed by alcohol and by the wearing of reversing lenses. Most of the film is devoted to a presentation of the ac-

tivities of several subjects who wear the reversing lenses for several weeks. For some subjects, the reversal is in the left-right relationship; for others, up-down.

In each case, there is initial confusion; but, with continued practice in such activities as fencing and watching shadows of body movements, the re-learning of spatial cues is presently accomplished. In 14 days, the 'left-right' subject is able to manage street traffic with no difficulty. After two months, the world again seems normal to him and the lenses are then removed. He then shows some initial confusion, which is nevertheless quickly overcome. In dealing with the 'up-down' reversal, the point is made that body movements are relative to the gravitational field.

This film should be of special interest to students of introductory psychology, in which problems of perception are covered. In general, the film shows that space perception is a learned behavior and involves the integration and utilization of visual, kinesthetic, and tactual cues. Although the behavioral content of the film provides no new information on space perception, it serves well to supplement the earlier work of Stratton and of Snyder and Pronko.

(For a different review of this film, previously available in U.S.A. under the title *Upright Vision Through Inverting Spectacles*, see *CP*, June 1956, 1, 187.)

Film

Give Them a Chance

J. P. Driscoll and M. A. Neuber, The Pennsylvania State University, Department of Education. 16-mm motion picture film, black and white, sound, 12 min., 1957. Available through Psychological Cinema Register, Audio-Visual Aids Library, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania. \$60.00, rental \$2.75.

ON THE OTHER HAND



DON JUANS AND TRUE LOVERS

William A. Hunt's review of two books on adjustment (*CP*, Feb. 1959, 4, 36f.) quotes Heyns as saying, "Carry on a serious affair with a theoretical assertion, but never marry one. Something better may come along." This attitude—the Don Juan approach to theory—is certainly a popular one today, but I think a word should be said also for the True Lover.

Certainly, we don't want our students to become rigidified in one theoretical mold so that contrary evidence is ignored and ambiguous data laid on a Procrustean bed. Certainly it is important to teach and practice great sensitivity to empirical results and their ramifications for the various theories. But there's more.

Equally needed is the man who marries a theory and tries as hard as he can to preserve the marriage. He becomes convinced that divorce is the only way out only after all other avenues have been explored. Indeed, many theories had shaky beginnings and many dark moments before the refined formulation emerged triumphant. It seems clear that if Galileo or Pasteur or Freud had been more of the Don Juan, the progress of science would have been considerably more stumbling. Fortunately, sharp and widespread criticisms and even apparently disconfirming data were not sufficiently discouraging.

Of course there are difficulties, too, for the True Lover. He can certainly become too dogged and resistant—this is a real danger. My plea is only to look in both directions for pitfalls. Let us teach and practice the virtues of flexibility. But also let us accord high acceptance to the activity of vigorous pursuit of all the implications of a theoretical position, undaunted by harsh criticism and even occasional negative instances.

We must learn not only when to leave, but also when to stay.

WILLIAM C. SCHUTZ
University of California, Berkeley

ABERRANT HEBB

For one, I am not disturbed by any selective biases in the choice of *CP*'s reviewers, having taken it for granted that the body psychologic is based on a bimodal distribution of personality types. There are those who gravitate to the wealthier and more urbane centers to participate in the high priesthood of dogma promulgation in the cathedrals of research. Others become missionaries to the hinterland and spread the gospel according to our Freud, Saint Hull, and others of the hierarchy.

The nature of missionary work is such that the latter must keep abreast of the current dogmas, having little time to promulgate their own. Let the task of criticism rest with those whose prime responsibility is to become thoroughly familiar with and reflect upon a more limited portion of the canons.

Without taking exception one wonders, though, whether one of the missionaries might have differed with Neil Bartlett's views of an introduction to the scriptures. There is a false gospel preached to authors: "See what everybody else is doing, then go thou and do likewise." Bartlett's review reflects a peripheralist bias, to skirt around the edge of the subject matter without plunging in. Some of us missionaries would prefer a centralist approach, one that goes right to the heart of psychology.

Donald Hebb's text (which I am happily using) deserved much more space than it received. I heartily concur with the comments that were made. It would seem to be of more than usual importance to recognize a publisher who has been converted from the cult of conformity. Psychologists above all should recognize the necessity of providing reinforcement for the kinds of behavior that they would like to elicit from publishers.

GORDON M. HARRINGTON
Wilmington College, Ohio

Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method and Philosophy

SIDNEY HOOK, Editor

Can psychoanalysis be called a scientific discipline, or is it merely a loose body of unrelated theory? What is the relationship between philosophy, psychoanalysis, and scientific method? For the first time in this country, leading figures in the two disciplines met to trade opinions on their respective aims and achievements. This book is a record of that meeting, the very lively second symposium of the New York University Institute of Philosophy.

Contents include: "Psychoanalysis as a Scientific Theory," Heinz Hartmann; "Methodological Issues in Psychoanalytic Theory," Ernest Nagel; "Psychoanalysis and Scientific Method," Lawrence S. Kubie; papers on psychoanalysis and society by Abram Kardiner, Alex Inkeles, and Ernest van den Haag; discussions of the relation of philosophy to psychoanalysis by Morris Lazerowitz, Donald Williams, and Antony Flew; and many other contributions.

370 pages \$5.00

NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY PRESS

New York 3, New York

NOW AVAILABLE

Publication Manual

of the
American
Psychological
Association

1957 Revision

A revision of the 1952 Manual, detailed instructions are given for the preparation of scientific articles. Organization and presentation of tabular material, figures and graphs, and reference lists are included. All scientists who are writing for publication will find the Publication Manual an indispensable guide.

Price \$1.00

Discounts on quantity
orders over 50 copies

Order from

**AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION**
Publications Office
1333 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington 6, D. C.

BOOKS RECEIVED

- AMBROSE, GORDON, & GEORGE NEWBOLD. *A handbook of medical hypnosis*. (2nd ed.) Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins, 1958. Pp. xiv + 276. \$6.75.
- BERDIE, R. F., W. L. LAYTON, E. O. SWANSON, & THEDA HAGENAH. *Counseling and the use of tests: a manual for the state-wide testing programs of Minnesota*. Minneapolis: Association of Minnesota Colleges and the Student Counseling Bureau, 1959. Pp. xii + 178. \$2.00.
- BLOFELD, JOHN (Trans.). *The Zen teaching of Huang Po: on the transmission of mind*. London: Rider & Co., 1959 (distributed by British Book Centre, New York). Pp. 136. \$3.25.
- EDDY, E. D., JR. *The college influence on student character*. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1959. Pp. xii + 185. \$3.00.
- EDUCATIONAL RECORDS BUREAU. *1958 Fall testing program in independent schools and supplementary studies*. (Educational Records Bulletin No. 73.) New York: Educational Records Bureau, 1959. Pp. xii + 63.
- FELDMAN, A. B. *The unconscious in history*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. Pp. 269. \$4.75.
- FELDMAN, S. S. *Mannerisms of speech and gestures in everyday life*. New York: International Universities Press, 1959. Pp. xviii + 301. \$5.00.
- GEORGE, A. L. *Propaganda analysis: a study of inferences made from Nazi propaganda in World War II*. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1959. Pp. xxii + 287. \$6.00.
- GLUECK, SHELDON (Ed.). *The problem of delinquency*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959. Pp. xiv + 1183. \$10.50.
- HALL, E. T. *The silent language*. Garden City: Doubleday, 1959. Pp. 240. \$3.95.
- HALMOS, PAUL, & ALAN ILIFFE (Eds.). *Readings in general psychology*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. Pp. x + 251. \$6.00.
- HARSH, C. M., & H. G. SCHRICKEL. *Personality: development and assessment*. (2nd ed.) New York: Ronald Press, 1959. Pp. vi + 536. \$6.75.
- HAWLEY, DON. *The nature of things*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. Pp. 187. \$3.75.
- HENRY, N. B. (Ed.). *Personnel services in education*. (Fifty-eighth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part II.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. Pp. xii + 304 + cv. \$4.00 (cloth), \$3.25 (paper).
- HESS, R. D., & GERALD HANDEL. *Family worlds: a psychosocial approach to family life*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. Pp. xiv + 306. \$5.00.
- JACOBS, MELVILLE. *The content and style of an oral literature: Clackamas Chinook myths and tales*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. Pp. viii + 285. \$5.00.
- JOHNSON, WENDELL, & 12 ASSOCIATES. *The onset of stuttering*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1959. Pp. xvi + 243. \$5.00.
- KARPMAN, BENJAMIN (Ed.). *Symposia on child and juvenile delinquency: presented at the American Orthopsychiatric Association*. Washington, D. C.: Psychodynamics Monograph Series, 1959. Pp. 364. \$10.00.
- LITTLE, ARTHUR D., INC. *Flavor research and food acceptance*. (Compiled from papers presented in a series of symposia given in 1956-57.) New York: Reinhold, 1958. Pp. vi + 391. \$10.00.
- MERTON, R. K., LEONARD BROOM, & L. S. COTTRELL, JR. (Eds.). *Sociology today: problems and prospects*. New York: Basic Books, 1959. Pp. xxxiv + 623. \$7.50.
- MEYER, H. J., & E. F. BORGATTA. *An experiment in mental patient rehabilitation: evaluating a social agency program*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1959. Pp. 114. \$2.50.
- NEESE, ROBERT. *Prison exposures*. Philadelphia: Chilton Company, 1959. Pp. xii + 135. \$4.95.
- RAINER, JEROME, & JULIA RAINER. *Sexual pleasure in marriage*. New York: Julian Messner, 1959. Pp. 251. \$4.95.
- SMITH, PAUL (Ed.). *Creativity: an examination of the creative process*. (A report on the third communications conference of the Art Directors Club of New York.) New York: Communication Arts Books, Hastings House, 1959. Pp. 210. \$4.95.
- VETTER, G. B. *Magic and religion: their psychological nature, origin, and function*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. Pp. 555. \$6.00.
- WASSELL, B. B. *Group psychoanalysis*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. Pp. xiv + 306. \$3.75.
- WICKES, FRANCES G. *The inner world of man*. New York: Frederick Ungar, 1959 (copyright 1938, 1948; reissued by arrangement with Henry Holt). Pp. 313 + 79 plates. \$5.50.
- WOLSTENHOLME, G. E. W., & CECILIA M. O'CONNOR (Eds.). *CIBA Foundation symposium on the neurological basis of behaviour: in commemoration of Sir Charles Sherrington*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1958. Pp. xii + 400. \$9.00.

Ready March 1959

RESEARCH IN PSYCHOTHERAPY

Proceedings of an interdisciplinary conference, Washington, D. C., April 9-12, 1958

ELI A. RUBINSTEIN and MORRIS B. PARLOFF, *Editors*

Presentations and discussions by leading investigators in psychotherapy research, both psychologists and psychiatrists, combine to produce a critical evaluation of research objectives and methodologies

Prepared papers by J. C. Whitehorn, J. D. Frank, Lewis Robbins and R. S. Wallerstein, Timothy Leary and Merton Gill, C. R. Rogers, George Saslow and J. D. Matarazzo, J. I. Lacey, E. S. Bordin, and W. U. Snyder present comprehensive descriptions of large-scale research programs and extensive analyses of crucial research problems

Formal discussion papers by J. M. Butler, David Shakow, Milton Greenblatt, and Maurice Lorr, and informal discussion by all 29 participants, provide expert commentary on present status of research. The summary chapter by the editors is an orderly presentation of the major issues covered by the conference

Price: \$3.00

Order from:

AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

Dept. RP
1333 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington 6, D. C.

PSYCHOLOGY AND REHABILITATION

BEATRICE A. WRIGHT, Ph.D.
Editor

Based on the proceedings of an Institute on the roles of psychology and psychologists in rehabilitation, sponsored by the American Psychological Association and supported by a grant from the Office of Vocational Rehabilitation, Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

The volume examines the principles and assumptions underlying the modern philosophy of rehabilitation, paying special attention to the roles and functions of psychologists as members of an interdisciplinary team. Problems of training are explored in detail and in the context of the changing nature of the field. Areas of needed research are highlighted.

Price \$1.50

Order from:

American Psychological Association, Inc.

Dept. PAR

1333 Sixteenth Street, N.W.

Washington 6, D. C.

